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Henderson

From Seriatim to Consensus and Back Again:
A Theory of Dissent
M. Todd Henderson*
When John Roberts acceded to the position of Chief Justice of the United States,
he stated that one of his top priorities was to reduce the number of dissenting opinions
issued by members of the Court.1 Roberts believes dissent is a symptom of dysfunction.2
This belief is shared with many justices past and present, the most famous of whom is
his predecessor John Marshall, who squelched virtually all dissent during his 35 years as
Chief Justice.3 One of their arguments is that dissent weakens the Court by exposing
internal divisions.4 The Court would be better, perhaps more efficient at deciding cases
and making law, if it spoke with one voice. This is a common refrain in American
constitutional history. Justice Louis Brandeis famously wrote that “[i]t is more
important that the applicable rule of law be settled than that it be settled right,” stating
that he would join opinions he disagreed with just for the sake of settling the law.5 Other
justices have called dissents “subversive literature”6 and “useless”7, and, we presume,
acted just like Brandeis.
Another reason for the hostility to dissent is that dissent enables the majority to
be bolder in its decision, because it is not forced to compromise. In a recent speech at
Georgetown Law School, Chief Justice Roberts explained that “[t]he broader the
agreement among the justices, the more likely it is a decision on the narrowest possible
grounds."8 Of course, this does not tell us the why this is good. We can guess it has
something to do with Bickel’s “passive virtues” and Sunstein’s one-case-at-a-time
minimalism. But whatever the reason, Roberts, like Marshall before him, believes that
limiting dissent will help him achieve his unstated goals.
To other past and present justices, most famously Chief Justice Harlan Stone and
Justice William Brennan, dissent is a healthy, and even necessary, practice that
* Assistant Professor, The University of Chicago Law School. Thank you to the Sarah Scaife Foundation, the Microsoft
Corporation, the George J. Phocas Fund, and the John M. Olin Foundation for research support. Daniel Klerman,
Alison LaCroix, Martha Nussbaum, James Oldham, Judge Richard Posner, and Geoffrey Stone gave many helpful
comments. Ali Beyer and Jason Lawrence provided research support.
1
See Hope Yen, Roberts Seeks Greater Consensus on Court, Wash Post, May 21, 2006, available at
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/05/21/AR2006052100678.html; see also, Chief
Justice John Roberts, Address to Georgetown University Class of 2006 (May 21, 2006) available at
http://www.law.georgetown.edu/webcast/eventDetail.cfm?eventID=144.
2
See Address to Georgetown University, Class of 2006, (cited in note 1).
3
See Part III.C. As discussed below, Marshall used leadership, example, and other techniques to discourage
dissent and build a collegial and consensus Court. There was some dissent, but as shown herein, it was trivial.
4
Learned Hand believed that dissent “cancels the impact of monolithic solidarity on which the authority of a
bench of judges so largely depends.” Learned Hand, The Bill of Rights 72 (1958).
5
Burnet v Coronado Oil & Gas Co, 285 US 393, 406 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
6
In an interview, Stewart characterized dissents in this way, quoting an unnamed law professor of his. See
Robert Bendiner, The Law and Potter Stewart An Interview With Justice Potter Stewart, American Heritage,
available at http://www.americanheritage.com/articles/magazine/ah/1983/1/1983_1_98.shtml (“Q: Isn’t it a matter
of concern, then, that the government should tempt people into committing an offense? A: It’s a matter of great
concern to me. I wrote a dissenting opinion in a similar case, but it was a dissenting opinion, and when I went to law
school we had a professor who said dissenting opinions are nothing but subversive literature.”).
7
See Northern Sec Co v United States, 193 US 197, 400 (1904) (opinion of Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes,
the “Great Dissenter”).
8
See Yen, Roberts Seeks Greater Consensus on Court, Wash Post (cited in note 1).
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improves the way in which law is made.9 We get better law, ceteris paribus, with dissent
than without.10 Their counter position rests in part on two ideas: first, dissents
communicate legal theories to other justices, lawyers, political actors, state courts, and
future justices, and have sometimes later won the day as a result of this; and second,
dissents are essential to reveal the deliberative nature of the Court, which in turn
enhances its institutional authority and legitimacy within American governance. Justice
Brennan describes the first idea as justices “contributing to the marketplace of
competing ideas” in an attempt to get at the truth or best answer.11 Chief Justice Charles
Evans Hughes captured this latter point when he observed that dissent, when a matter
of conviction, is needed “because what must ultimately sustain the court in public
confidence is the character and independence of the judges.”12
So who is right? Is dissent a symptom of a dysfunctional Court or of a healthy
one? Is dissent essential to getting the best possible legal rule or does it lead to murky or
bad legal rules? Throughout its history, the Supreme Court has sometimes issued
predominantly unanimous opinions, while at other times it has often issued separate
opinions. Since the trend is toward the latter, one might conclude that there has been
learning and evolution—that the practice today is better than the practice in the past.
But the almost thousand-year history of separate opinions by English courts gives us
reason to doubt this. Another possibility is that judicial practices are tailored to the
times. If we believe this, then we must ask what it is about the times that leads to any
particular practice.
I conclude that there is no simple answer to the question of how courts should
decide cases or deliver opinions. Issuing dissenting opinions is not a natural condition
or even the most effective, efficient, or rational system for making law. But the
elimination of dissents would not move the Court in the direction of a better state of
discourse. Instead, the style of appellate decisionmaking reflects the poweraccumulating tendencies of courts and the law generally. There is no neutral answer to
the question of how courts should communicate their decisions. Style reflects power,
and the Court’s choice of style is about the Court’s power.
This is not a new idea in philosophy: Michel Foucault and others tell us that truth
is not determined in a vacuum, but rather is revealed only through an exercise of
power.13 So too here. The Court has no army, no guns, and no bureaucrats to enforce its
will, so its power must come from somewhere else.14 Its power resides in the only place
where the Court communicates with those on the outside—its opinions.15 The content of
9
See William J. Brennan Jr, In Defense of Dissents, 37 Hastings L J 427, 438 (1986) (defending dissents on
multiple grounds and calling dissent a “duty”); see also Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Speaking in a Judicial Voice, 67 NYU L
Rev 1185 (1992) (presenting several arguments justifying the current practice of frequent dissenting opinions); Ruth
Bader Ginsburg, Remarks on Writing Separately, 65 Wash L Rev 133 (1990) (same).
10
Cass Sunstein makes a more general case for the value of dissent in all aspects of decision-making in a
recent book. See Cass R. Sunstein, Why Societies Need Dissent 210-11 (2006) (“Organizations and nations are far
more likely to prosper if they welcome dissent and promote openness.”).
11
Brennan, 37 Hastings L J at 438 (cited in note 9) (“Through dynamic interaction among members of the
present Court and through dialogue across time with the future Court, we ensure the continuing contemporary
relevance and hence vitality of the principles of our fundamental charter.”).
12
Charles Evans Hughes, The Supreme Court of the United States 67-68 (1928).
13
Here I draw on Foucault’s “power/knowledge” dynamic. See Michel Foucault, Power/Knowledge: Selected
Interviews and Other Writings, 1972-1977 (1980).
14
Hand, The Bill of Rights (cited in note 4).
15
The power of the Supreme Court manifests itself in many forms, including in structural Prestige and the
reputation of individual justices, but is expressed through only one form: the written legal opinion.
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opinions is an essential element of this power, but so is the style or manner in which
they are issued. And because decisions are an exercise of power, we should expect the
manner in which the Court communicates its decisions to reflect the Court’s power.16 In
other words, the presence or absence of separate opinions depends on the goals of the
Court.17
To test this hypothesis, I briefly examine the history of dissent.18 I show that the
manner in which appellate law is made has changed several times throughout AngloAmerican legal history in an attempt to increase the power of courts over other forms of
dispute resolution. The Supreme Court, and its predecessors in England, sometimes
issued dissents and sometimes spoke largely with one voice. In each case, the choice
about which style to use was made with an eye toward bringing more business or more
interesting business or more influential business to the court.
A change in the delivery of opinions designed to increase the power of “Law” has
happened at least three times on a grand scale: (1) the change from seriatim opinions to
an “opinion of the court” in England circa 1760; (2) a similar change in the United States
Supreme Court upon the ascendancy of John Marshall to Chief Justice in 1801; and (3)
the development of a tradition of writing separately during the New Deal era, which has
persisted to the present.19 In each of these examples, the change of discourse was a
power-play designed to increase the role of law in shaping the norms of society.
England’s abandonment of seriatim opinions was designed to increase the reach of law
into the regulation of commercial activity; the Supreme Court’s similar change in the era
of Marshall was intended to increase the role of the Court generally and to assert the
authority of the judiciary in the fledgling days of American democracy; and the rise of
dissent in the New Deal era was necessary to expand the influence of the Court and Law
in deciding disputes previously addressed by other, extra-judicial means.
Those seeking to control “truth” in each instance used a change in discourse to
achieve power within their society for themselves, their class, or their group.20 This does
not necessarily mean that there were explicit or even conscious plans by those making
As is the case for automobiles, architecture, toothbrushes, and most other things in life, for Legal opinions,
form follows function. Architect Louis Sullivan of the Chicago School made the phrase “form follows function” famous
by christening a new style of architecture for sky scrapers that emphasized exposing the structural realities of
buildings instead of hiding them behind adornments. See Louis Sullivan, The Tall Office Building Artistically
Considered, Lippincott’s Magazine, Mar 1896.
17
This raises the obvious question of how we can speak of the goals and objectives of “the Court” when it is
composed of individuals and when we normally don’t think of multi-member bodies in this way. The idea here is that
the Court is just a proxy for the overall sociological and subconscious forces at work.
18
Foucault would call this a “genealogical” study of dissent. Genealogy is the process of looking to the past
for an explanation or greater understanding or appreciation of the present. By looking at the reasons (underlying or
overt) dissent is encouraged, tolerated, or squashed at a given time by courts, genealogy may provide us with the
perspective to call the conventional wisdom about dissent into question.
19
The evolution of appellate discourse may be roughly analogous to the theory of “punctuated equilibrium”
in evolutionary biology. See Niles Eldredge & Stephen Jay Gould, Punctuated equilibria: an alternative to phyletic
gradualism, in T.J.M. Schopf, ed, Models in Paleobiology, 82-115 (1985). Changes in style, tone, approach, length,
etc. occur gradually over the years, and then there is a sudden change precipitates a dramatic reordering of the
predominate discourse. In this view, the changes of Mansfield and Marshall were the legal equivalents of the asteroids
that destroyed the dinosaurs and the trilobites. The theory has been applied in the public policy context. See Frank
Baumgartner, et al., The Destruction of Issue Monopolies in Congress, 87 Am Pol Sci Rev 673 (1993) (showing that
government policies in some areas are characterized by long periods of stability, and are disrupted occasional but rare
shocks).
20
Lawrence M. Friedman, A History of American Law 29 (1985) (“In modern times, law is an instrument;
the people in power use it to push or pull toward some definite goal.”).
16
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the change. The Court and the individual justices did not necessarily intend the
consequence, but they were affected by sociological forces beyond their ken.
This paper is organized as follows. Part I explores the relation between discourse
and power, and how this impacts our conceptions of truth. The goal is to put the opinion
delivery practices of the Supreme Court in the context of their larger role in formulating
the legal framework through which truth in our society is determined. Part II examines
the Anglo-American history of dissenting opinions. The takeaway is that dissent and
unanimity norms are merely tools used to increase the power of the Court and law. Part
III describes current practices, focusing on the change from the Rehnquist to the
Roberts Court.
Roberts’s desire to move the Court toward unanimity might be seen as a
countermove in this historical vector of more power for courts and law. His discursive
move, which doesn’t appear to be working, is also about the Court’s power, but it may be
about decreasing the Court’s power. Although somewhat unique in the history of the
Court, his attempt to deemphasize the Court’s role in social disputes appears to be
consistent with his jurisprudential philosophy. Here again, we see that discourse is
power, whether for greater or lesser.
I.

Discourse, Power & Truth

Law is to a great extent what judges say it is,21 and how they say it, is one of the
primary sources of legal authority. In our society law is often synonymous with power,
and it greatly influences the pursuit of “truth.”22 Not only do laws define the locus of
acceptable conduct, but they also set the framework in which truth is determined.
Whether the issue is the veracity of a litigant’s claim or the impact of a business merger
on consumer well being, law establishes the rules whereby competing claims of truth are
weighed. This was not always the case. In other societies, at other times, various forms
of truth existed outside or above the law. Religion or magic often was the source.23 Law
has displaced these forces so that “the characteristic of our Western societies [is] that
the language of power is law.”24
But the law does much more than this. Law constructs much of modern
discourse. It authorizes some to speak and some views to be taken seriously, while
marginalizing or excluding others. The law frames discourse that affects all citizens
through the creation of “episteme”—historically enduring discursive regularities that act
as perception grids within which thought, communication, and action can occur. Court
rules, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the Federal Rules of Evidence, and the
21
H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law 138 (1961) (“A supreme tribunal has the last word in Saying what the law
is and, when it has said it, the statement that the court was ‘wrong’ has no Consequences within the system: no one's
rights or duties are thereby altered.”).
22
Here we see the intuition of Max Weber, whose famous speech to Munich University students, Politics as a
Vocation, introduced the concept that the state has a monopoly on the legitimate use of physical violence. See Daniel
Warner, An Ethic of Responsibility in International Relations 9-10 (1991).
23
It is well known that religious or pseudo-religious entities have historically been rivals of law. See, for
example, Friedman, History of American Law at 52, 65 (cited in note 20) (“[C]hurches . . . worked . . . as rivals of
courts.”). In England, this tradition survived well into the 19th Century, and it is arguably still true in some advanced
nations, and definitely true in other societies. See id at 202 (“In England [in the 1800’s], ecclesiastical courts had
jurisdiction over marriage and divorce, and the church had an important role in family law.”).
24
Foucault, Power/Knowledge at 201 (cited in note 13).
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delivery of opinions are all legal “grids” within which truth is produced. In other words,
discourses generate truth. As Foucault writes:
Each society has its regime of truth, its ‘general politics’ of
truth: that is, the type of discourse which it accepts and
makes function as true; the mechanisms and instances which
enable one to distinguish true and false statements, the
means by which each is sanctioned; the techniques and
procedures accorded value in the acquisition of truth; the
status of those who are charged with saying what counts as
true.25
Law is the “general politics” of the modern era, and legal opinions are the
fundamental discourse of this politics. Initially lower courts establish the rules for how
the truth will be determined in a particular case. Then appellate courts act as an
additional guardian of a particular form of truth by acting as a normalizing influence
over the lower courts. The Supreme Court fills this same normalization role vis-à-vis the
appellate courts. The result is the creation of a regularized and legalized form of truth.26
Appellate judges determine the boundaries of what is proper and improper for
individuals in particular cases, for lower courts, and for the practice of law in general.27
This legal grid is not usually transparent or obvious to the lay public, but it is the locus
of acceptable legal behavior within which society is required to function. Things or
actions inside this set of behaviors are accepted as true and proper; those outside are
punished. This is true not only for specific legal rules (for example, briefs submitted
within a set period of days are accepted, those outside are not), but also for society more
broadly (for example, burning a flag is protected “speech,” while burning a cross is
generally not).28 In other words, judges—and especially appellate judges—determine
what is “normal” and what is “abnormal” in our society in subjects ranging far beyond
the narrow world of the courtroom. In this way, law is a normalizing force and a judicial
opinion is a normalizing act.29
Id at 131.
This concept of “truth” is divergent from any conventional definition. Historically the word “truth” was
synonymous with “fact” or “actuality.” In this traditional world, truth is neutral and reveals itself only when the
corrupting forces of power are absent. Perhaps this understanding of truth explains why for most of Anglo-American
history legal judgments were made in public, openly and extemporaneously by each judge, where there was no
possibility of “backroom dealing.” This type of discourse was used under the guise of trying to avoid (or show) the
influence or coercion of power. But truth cannot exist independently of power. In the police station, the courtroom,
the state house, the workplace, and throughout modern society, law is the power that enables the production of
knowledge and the determination of truth.
27
The law does more than allow truth to be revealed in a certain way. Law is one of the most powerful
discourses in that it claims not only to reveal the truth, like science, but also to consecrate it as the Law, the sole
source of legitimate physical power. In this context, an appellate opinion is a source of truth and a representation of
power, not so much as an evaluation of the “facts” of a particular case, but rather what “facts” are acceptable within
the legal grid that the court creates. It is up to the lower courts to determine the truth, but the appellate court enables
the truth to be discovered in a particular way.
28
This is not exactly correct. Burning a cross and burning a flag are both protected to some extent; what
differentiates the treatment of these two acts of speech is the existence of threat in the former case. Cross burning can
be prohibited only when it is a threat. In theory, the state could prohibit flag burning if it was viewed as a threat, but
this is much more difficult to imagine. The end result in most cases will be that burning a flag is OK, while burning a
cross is not.
29
See Michel Foucault, Discipline and Punish 187-92 (1975) (using hospitals as a prototypical example of the
growth of normalization through record keeping and other forms of documentary power).
25
26
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Appellate opinions achieve this role of normalization in several ways. First and
foremost, the opinion seals the fate of the parties before the court and establishes a
precedent for actors in future cases. In addition, the opinion delineates the bounds of
acceptable reasoning for lower courts. This control is exercised not only over the
substantive decision, but also over details of procedure, including what witnesses may
testify and what evidence judges and juries may consider. Finally, the opinion will set
the broad boundaries of acceptable legal conduct and argument: law students learn by
reading appellate opinions; lawyers plan cases and strategies by studying appellate
opinions; and judges decide cases by following previous appellate opinions. The content,
the structure, and tone of judicial opinions influence all these players in the practice of
law. Courts therefore determine the scope of their own authority through their
discourse.
This discourse among litigants, judges, lawyers, academics, students, and the
public is greatly influenced by the manner in which appellate opinions are issued. The
most important influence on this discourse is the presence or absence of separate
opinions. There are many ways of deciding and announcing the result of a legal dispute:
there could be a collection of opinions from each judge without an opinion of the court
as a whole (seriatim opinions, as was the tradition in England for hundreds of years);
there could be a single unsigned opinion with no permitted dissent (unanimous, per
curiam opinions issued without a public vote, as is the current practice in civil law
countries such as Germany and France)30; or there could be an opinion of a majority of
the judges (either signed or unsigned) along with any concurring or dissenting opinions
(as is primarily the practice in American federal and state courts).31
The structure of appellate opinions is an integral part of the creation of legal truth
grids. A unanimous opinion (9-0) by the Supreme Court will foster a much different
reaction than a 5-4 decision with several scathing dissents. Unanimous opinions settle
the law. Lower courts may try to carve out small areas of disagreement within the legal
grid, but the message of the Court is that this issue is decided and will not be
reconsidered any time soon. No foreseeable changes in Court personnel or attitude are
likely to change the votes of five justices. By contrast a 5-4 decision will send quite a
different message to lower courts and to lawyers who want to challenge the precedent.
Challenges may be fruitful when a change in the Court’s membership makes the vote
uncertain or when a compelling case forces one or two justices to reconsider their vote.
Therefore, dissenting opinions are more likely to create uncertainty.
This uncertainty will produce a much different process for determining “truth.”32
The resulting discourse – be it ambiguous, disputed, apparently unassailable, or
obscure – determines, or at least greatly influences, our conception of legal “knowledge”
and the determination of legal “truth.” Throughout history the process of deciding cases,
of establishing how the “truth” will be determined, has changed, and with it the legal
discourse has changed. Seriatim opinions were common at certain times and in certain
Continental law (and the law in Japan, China, and other non-Anglo-American countries) is not made by
judges but is contained mostly in written statutory codes. In the common law system, in contrast, a great deal of law is
made by the opinions of judges. Friedman, History of American Law at 22 (cited in note 20).
31
For an analysis of the difference between these styles, see Ginsburg, Speaking in a Judicial Voice at 67
(cited in note 9); Ginsburg, Remarks on Writing Separately, at 133 (cited in note 9).
32
This analysis is true, of course, only in a legal system in which judges express their differences in public
through concurring and dissenting opinions. In France and Germany, all opinions carry the same discursive impact
because disagreement is not published.
30
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nations, while unanimous opinions dominated at other times and in certain countries or
legal systems. But what determines the shape of appellate discourse and why do we see
different types of discourse at different times and across different societies?
II.

A Brief History of Dissent

There are only three widely used ways in which multi-judge courts have delivered
judicial decisions over nearly a thousand of years of Anglo-American jurisprudence. The
first is the seriatim delivery of the judgment of each judge individually. This practice
prevailed in Great Britain for nearly all of its history, from the time of William the
Conqueror to the present day. It also was common in U.S. courts (both state and federal)
at the Founding. The second is delivering an “opinion of the court,” with no publicly
revealed vote or separate opinions. This practice has been used twice: by Lord Mansfield
of the King’s Bench in England and (more or less) by John Marshall of the United States
Supreme Court. Finally, the modern practice in the United States is a hybrid, in which
an opinion of a majority of the court is issued, but judges decide individually whether to
“write separately.”
A.

The English Experience

For almost a thousand years, decisions of multi-member courts in England were
delivered orally by each judge seriatim and without any prior intra-court consultation.33
The opinions, the sum of which would amount to the legal rule in the case, were not
even published until the early seventeenth century. Prior to that time, case reports were
the written compilation of the notes of prominent lawyers at the trial, who recorded, to
the best of their ability, the proceedings of the court and the orally delivered opinions of
the judges. Because more than one lawyer might take notes on a particular case, there
were often multiple, and perhaps conflicting, reports. These reports, covering a huge
swath of English legal history dating back to at least the reign of King Edward I and
going forward to at least the reign of Henry VIII, were originally published in raw form,
and were used by lawyers as source material and precedent. The unedited and
unabridged compilations were massive and did not present a coherent picture of the
law. Lawyers and judges had a difficult time even knowing the legal rule from a case.34
“Precedent” was virtually unknown because it implies the existence of a set of judgments
available to parties and judges. Abridgements of leading cases appeared by the late
fifteenth century,35 but the quality varied tremendously, and no systematic court
“reports” were issued until Edward Coke published his case notes in 1609.36 (There were
See, for example, William H. Rehnquist, The Supreme Court 40 (2001).
William Murray, who practiced before the Court of Chancery in the mid-Eighteenth Century (when
reporting was still poor in equity courts), wrote: “It is a misfortune attending a court of equity, that the cases are
generally taken in loose notes, and sometimes by persons who do not understand business, and very often draw
general principles from a case, without attending to particular circumstances, which weighed with the court in the
determination of these cases.” James Oldham, English Common Law in the Age of Mansfield 366 (2004).
35
The first abridgment was made by Nicholas Statham, Baron of the Exchequer under Edward IV, in around
1470. 8 The Cambridge History of English and American Literature, Chapter XIII sec. 9, (1907) (“As the number of
the Year Books increased, it became convenient to make classified abridgments of their leading cases. The first of
these was made, about 1470, by Nicholas Statham, baron of the exchequer under Edward IV”).
36
Edward Coke, who served as Chief Justice of the Court of Common Pleas and then the King’s Bench,
became the first English jurist to publish his opinions in 1609. His cases became Volume I of the English Reports.
33
34
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no “official” case reports until the late eighteenth century, and the regular practice of
issuing official court reports of cases did not become regular until the mid-nineteenth
century.) The “poverty of the law reports,” as C.H.S. Fifoot writes, contributed to the
lack of clarity of the law.37 This had many bad effects, but, as shown below, the lack of
clarity did not become a crisis until the rise of commerce in the mid-Seventeenth
Century.
Even after Coke and his contemporaries formulated the issuance of official
reports of judicial decisions, the practice of each judge delivering his opinion seriatim
continued. Although tradition and a sense of efficiency sustained this practice, we can
only speculate as to its origins. One possibility is concern about concealed power. Oral
delivery by each individual judge may be a more accountable method of deciding cases
than decisions made in seclusion, because judgments made in the open and without
explicit caucus among the judges may be less likely to be (or appear to be) infected by
corruption or collusion or the influence of the monarch. As critics complained after
certain American courts departed from the seriatim tradition, forcing individual judges
to give their account provided a basis to hold judges accountable, which in turn gave
them an incentive to work hard and do well.38
The long and unbroken tradition of delivering opinions seriatim was changed
unilaterally with the ascendancy of William Murray, known as “Lord Mansfield,” to the
position of Lord Chief Justice of the King’s Bench in 1756.39 Mansfield introduced a
procedure for generating agreement and consensus among judges and then issuing
caucused opinions. The judges met collectively in the secrecy of their chambers, worked
out their differences into a compromise decision, and then wrote what was to be
delivered as an anonymous and unanimous “opinion of the court.” Mansfield made this
dramatic change in an attempt to bring clarity to the law in order to bring English
commercial law in line with prevailing practices in trades and in other countries.40 He
succeeded. Jim Oldham, the world’s leading Mansfield scholar, summarizes his
accomplishment: “[Mansfield] established the basic principles that continue to govern
the mercantile energies of England and America down to the present day.”41
During the Middle Ages and until Mansfield, the law governing business affairs—
known as “the law merchant”—was administered by special lay courts at “fairs” set up on
These were his personal account of the cases, and they are generally considered to be misleading, often reporting what
he wanted the result or reasoning to be instead of what it actually was. See, for example, J.H. Baker, New Light on
Slade’s Case, 29 Cambridge Law J. 213 (1971) (showing how Coke’s reporting introduced inaccurate distortions into
the law).
37
See Cecil H.S. Fifoot, Lord Mansfield 89 (1936).
38
See text accompanying notes 93-109. Thomas Jefferson, a strong critic of the “opinion of the court,” wrote:
“An opinion is huddled up in conclave, perhaps by a majority of one, delivered as if unanimous, and with the silent
acquiescence of lazy or timid associates, by a crafty chief judge, who sophisticates the law to his own mind, by the turn
of his own reasoning.” Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Thomas Ritchie (Dec. 25, 1820), in Paul L. Ford, ed,10 The
Writings of Thomas Jefferson 169, 171 (1899).
39
Murray served as Lord Chief Justice from 1756 to 1788. The King’s Bench was one of three common law
courts in England at the time. Although there were rival courts of various royal and nonroyal statures, the King’s
Bench was the most important common law court in the land. Appeals were possible but largely unknown, and
therefore the King’s Bench had the ultimate say in most matters, especially those of a commercial nature.
40
Friedman, History of American Law at 133 (cited in note 20). Mansfield recognized the importance of the
law merchant, which was based largely on commercial customs in practice in some areas since the Middle Ages, and
incorporated it into general rules of application within the larger common law.
41
Oldham, Law in the Age of Mansfield at 10 (cited in note 35).
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trade routes, in trade centers, or that traveled across Europe.42 The law merchant was
distinct from the common law because it was international in scope and based largely on
trade-specific customs that were unique to the commercial setting. The law merchant
consisted primarily of semi-codified customs that developed over the course of many
years and many thousands of transactions.43 It also existed in various treaties and legal
codes set out by scholars and merchants in trade centers, like Rhodes, Barcelona, and
Visby.44
In many cases, this customary law differed from the more structured formalities
of English common law.45 For example, the common law gave tremendous advantages to
parties enforcing a written contact “sealed by the party against whom the claim was
made,” but in fair courts this rule was generally waived.46 In general, the customs and
practices of trades were the law of commerce on the Continent, which was foreign to
judges, juries, and judgments in English courts. Lord Holt, who preceded Mansfield as
chief justice, noted when describing why the “law” should be insulated from the
influence of merchants: “no protagonist, however influential, [should] be permitted to
dictate the terms upon which his dispute should be resolved.”47 In this respect, England
differed substantially from the continent of Europe, where trade guild law was well
incorporated into the body of general law.48 As could be expected, this procedural
difference made law courts less valuable for resolving commercial disputes.
The unprecedented growth in trade and commerce during the Eighteenth
Century made the usefulness of courts in settling commercial law disputes an especially
acute problem. In the fifty years before Mansfield became chief justice and for the fifty
years after, international commerce became essential to the success of England’s
expanding empire.49 As Dr. Samuel Johnson noted in 1756, the same year Mansfield was
called to the bench, “there was never from the earliest ages a time in which trade so
Edmund Heward, Lord Mansfield: A Biography of William Murray, 1st Earl of Mansfield (1705-1793)
Lord Chief Justice for 32 Years 99 (1979); Friedman, History of American Law at 28 (note 20) (“There were many
types of merchant courts, including the colorful courts of piepowder, a court of the fairs where merchants gathered.”).
Recent scholarship casts doubt on the view that the law merchant was a system of private ordering among merchants
that was somehow superior to modern commercial law. See, for example, Emily Kadens, Order within Law, Variety
within Custom: The Character of the Medieval Merchant Law, 5 Chi J International L 38, 63 (2004) (describing the
law merchant as a “layer of laws and practices that included legislative mandates, broad-reaching customs, and
narrow trade usages).
43
For a modern example, see Lisa Bernstein, Private Commercial Law in the Cotton Industry: Creating
Cooperation Through Rules, Norms, and Institutions, 99 Mich L Rev 1724 (2001) (describing the private commercial
law used by merchants in the cotton industry).
44
In the famous case, Luke v Lyde, Lord Mansfield cited to various laws of the sea, including Rhodian Laws,
the Consolato del Mere (Barcelona), and the laws of Visby. See Bridget Murphy, Luke v Lyde, 2003 Auckland Univ L
Rev 2 (2003).
45
Edward Coke, who preceded Lord Mansfield on the King’s Bench by 150 years, declared in 1608 that “the
Law Merchant is part of this realm,” see 1 Edward Coke, Institutes of the Laws of England 182a (1648), but this did
not mean that customary commercial law was fully incorporated into the common law or that common law courts
stepped aside and let merchant courts settle disputes. A century and a half after Coke made this statement the
common law was largely ignorant and disrespectful of the Law Merchant. See W.S. Holdsworth, The Rules of Venue,
and the Beginnings of the Commercial Jurisdiction of the Common Law Courts, 7 Colum L Rev 551, 561-62 (1914)
(“It was not till the common law obtained in Lord Mansfield a judge who was a master of [foreign writings on
commercial customs] that the rules deducible from the many various commercial customs which had come before the
courts were formed into a coherent system, and completely incorporated with the common law.”).
46
See Heward, Lord Mansfield at 100-01 (cited in note 44).
47
Fifoot, Lord Mansfield at 9 (cited in note 38).
48
See Heward, Lord Mansfield at 99-101 (cited in note 44).
49
See P. Marshall, The Eighteenth Century (1988) 53 (noting during the period 1697 to 1815 exports
increased much faster than population growth or economic growth as a whole).
42
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much engaged the attention of mankind, or commercial gain was sought with such
general emulation.”50 At this time “the place of the Law Merchant in English law was
considerably unsettled . . . [because] very few general rules and principles had been
established to which isolated decisions could be adjusted.”51 English courts were not
viewed as being equipped to offer a valuable service to commercial parties. The
inadequacy of common law courts is apparent from commentary by merchants at the
time. One influential guide for merchants noted that “[t]he right dealing merchant doth
not care how little he hath to do in the Common Law.”52 Others advocated the
establishment of specialty courts, impugning the law courts for not understanding
commercial issues and creating confusion with their opinions.53
The divergence between formal and informal law, between common and
commercial law, was a problem for law courts since their inadequacy simply pushed
commercial disputes to other forums of dispute resolution. Courts were, from the
perspective of business interests, overly formal and out of touch with the reality of
commerce. The growth of commercial transactions in number, size, and complexity only
exacerbated the problem.54 As commerce became more demanding of law, the
hodgepodge of courts (e.g., courts of law, courts of equity, law merchant courts,
ecclesiastical courts, etc.) regulating commerce added to the misfit between common
law adjudication and the needs of business. This manifested itself in two ways.
First, different courts made different rules, creating uncertainty for businesses.
There were over 70 law “courts” operating in London in the late eighteenth century, and
these were administered by almost 800 judges.55 Although this plethora of courts gave
plaintiffs a wide range of options to find the best venue for their claim, the lack of a
centralized or systematic reporting system made the mishmash of courts a nightmare
for anyone looking for clear legal rules. Even with a modern database like Westlaw,
English judges and litigants at the time would have had difficulty determining the rule
for any particular case. The plight of businessmen planning their affairs without legal
counsel would have been nearly hopeless.
Even when we narrow the number of courts to the most important ones,56 this
still leaves three—Common Pleas, Exchequer, and Kings’ Bench—all of which had
See Fifoot, Lord Mansfield at 4 (cited in note 38).
Murphy, Luke v. Lyde at 4 (cited in note 45).
52
John Marius, Advice Concerning Bills of Exchange (Early English books On-line, Electronic Reproduction
Ann Arbor, Michigan 1999).
53
John D. Cary, An Essay on the State of England in Relation to Its Trade (Printed by W Bonny 1695, Early
English books On-line, Electronic Reproduction Ann Arbor, Michigan 1999) (advocating “Courts of Merchants... for
the speedy deciding all differences relating to Sea Affairs, which are better ended by those who understand them, than
they are in Westminster-Hall.”); see also Josiah Child, A Discourse About Trade (Printed by A Sowle 1689, Early
English books On-line, Electronic Reproduction Ann Arbor, Michigan 1999) (“it is well if, after great expenses of time
and money, we can make our own Counsel (being Common Lawyers) understand one half of our Case, we being
amongst them as in a Foreign Country.”).
54
For example, during the time when Lord Mansfield was Chief Justice the number of cases involving
promissory notes or bills of exchange increased about 100 percent per year, over three times the increase in cases
overall. Heward, Lord Mansfield at 53 (cited in note 44).
55
See Patrick Colquhoun, A Treatise on the Police of the Metropolis 383-88 (5th ed.) (describing 9 supreme
courts, 4 ecclesiastical courts, 17 courts for the City of London, 8 courts for the City of Westminster, 14 courts for the
part of the city lying in County of Middlesex, 8 courts in the Borough of Southwark, 18 courts for small debts, one
court of oyer and terminer, 4 courts of general and quarter sessions of the peace, 10 courts for the police petty
matters, and 5 corners’ courts. These were overseen by 753 judges. Id at 389. This does not include the innumerable
merchants’ courts, private arbitration proceedings, and other methods for resolving disputes.
56
These three courts were the primary source of the Common Law during this period, despite being
responsible for only a small percentage of cases. See Oldham, Law in the Age of Mansfield at 12 (cited in note 35).
50
51
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overlapping jurisdiction.57 Decisions from these courts were not binding on other
courts,58 meaning there were (at least) three relevant sources of legal precedents for any
particular dispute. According to Oldham, “[t]he horizontal structure of the English
general courts, with three common law courts, each court operating largely
independently of the others, inhibited growth of the notion of binding precedent.”59 In
addition, separate equity courts, specifically the Court of Chancery, existed as an
alternative to law courts. Although the equity courts had limited jurisdiction, they were
available for many commercial law disputes. To complicate matters, equity courts
typically had even worse reporting than the law courts.60
It is not surprising that these many courts competed with each other for business.
They did so not only for the reputational benefits, but for cash, since judges were paid by
the case.61 According to a recent study, judges therefore had an incentive to rule in favor
of plaintiffs because they were the party that chose the venue in most common law
cases.62 Plaintiffs also had an incentive to choose a venue that increased their prospects,
regardless of the impact on future cases, which could be brought in other courts. If a
business wanted to enforce a contract without a sealed, written document, it could bring
an action at a merchant fair instead filing a formal pleading with a law court. And if a
business had an equitable action to bring—for example, that a contract should be
enforced despite technical defects—it would have to do so in Chancery, where this
argument was allowed, as opposed to the law courts. In this way, the various courts
competed for the business of commercial dispute resolution. By making favorable rules
or procedures, courts could attract more disputes (taking market share from competing
courts) and perhaps encourage more suits due to reduced transaction costs (growing the
pie).
Second, even within a specific court jurisdiction, the use of seriatim opinions
added a layer of confusion. Instead of manifesting a binary win-loss character, opinions
were a collection of “for” and “against” arguments. To determine whether one had won
or lost a case, and, more importantly what the rule of the case was and how strong the
precedent was, it was necessary to count heads. In complex commercial disputes, this
was not an easy matter. Moreover, interpreting past cases to plan future arguments was
also exceedingly complex given the plethora of opinions on every subject and the often
highly nuanced differences among them. Accordingly, during this period the law became
much more “confusing and remote to merchants and businessmen.”63 Thus the nascent
These courts, comprised of four judges each, had overlapping jurisdiction, and therefore competed for
cases. As Daniel Klerman argues in a recent paper, competition was fierce, since judges were paid by the case. See
Daniel M. Klerman, Jurisdictional Competition and the Evolution of the Common Law, 74 Univ Chi L. Rev 1179,
1189-90 (2007).
58
Oldham, Law in the Age of Mansfield at 366 (cited in note 35) (“Decisions from another court would be
looked to only as advisory or as a means of persuasion.”).
59
Id at at 365.
60
William Murray, who practiced before the Court of Chancery in the mid-Eighteenth Century (when
reporting was still poor in equity courts), wrote: “It is a misfortune attending a court of equity, that the cases are
generally taken in loose notes, and sometimes by persons who do not understand business, and very often draw
general principles from a case, without attending to particular circumstances, which weighed with the court in the
determination of these cases.” Oldham, Law in the Age of Mansfield at 366 (cited in note 35).
61
See Klerman, Jurisdictional Competition at 9-11 (cited in note 58) (showing that fees paid to judges per
case were substantial and sufficient to bias their decisions in favor of plaintiffs, who chose the venue)
62
Id.
63
Friedman, History of American Law at 95 (cited in note 20).
57
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commercial law of England was uncertain, exactly the opposite of what businesses
needed to thrive.
From the perspective of eighteenth century merchants what was needed was
someone or something to bring more certainty to commercial dealings, simplify legal
proceedings, and create a simple set of rules that could be applied to all transactions.64
According to Mansfield, the law of business “ought not to depend on subtleties and
niceties, but upon rules easily learned and easily retained because they are dictates of
common sense . . .”65
From the perspective of courts what was needed was a way to bring the business
of commercial regulation to law courts—to increase the market share of law courts.66
Mansfield’s strategy was to make the decisions of his court (i.e., his product) more
attractive to potential litigants (i.e., potential customers). To do this, Mansfield adopted
the best practices of competitors. He created a set of general principles based on the
valuable services that rival courts offered business litigants. These general principles
included the requirement of good faith (from equitable courts) and the use of trade
custom (from the law merchant or fair courts). Mansfield believed that the international
nature of commerce meant that commercial law must be the “same all over the world”67
and that England therefore had to move its formal law in the direction of traditional
practices in other countries. “He . . . encouraged the development of legal rules that
would support a commercial economy that was increasingly dependent on paper credit
and that was vigorously involved in international trade.”68 Related to this was his view
that legal rules should be understood by those “who must obey [them].”69 The normative
underpinning of Mansfield’s revolution was certainty: “the great object in every branch
of law, but especially in mercantile law, is certainty.”70
But Mansfield needed a mechanism to deliver certainty. He found it in the
“opinion of the court.” The reform of the common law of commerce was possible only
with an assertion of judicial power through a united court speaking in a single voice.
Mansfield’s expertise and clarity provided a certain statement of the law that drew cases
to his court—no longer would multiple courts and numerous judges produce different
opinions subject to nuance and ambiguity. A single court would hear and decide the
fundamental issues of commercial law, decide them once and for all without dispute or
ambiguity, and provide the certainty and stability needed for commercial transactions.71
The arc of the famous case Luke v. Lyde is instructive. After a merchant ship was
captured at sea and then recaptured, the privateer, ship owner, and captain litigated, in
64
Id at 58 (“The merchant’s idea of a good legal system was one that was rational and efficient, conforming
to his values and expectations – traits that neither lay justice neither the baroque extravagances of English procedure
[at law courts] supplied.”).
65
Hamilton v Mendes, 2 Burr 1214 (1761).
66
Friedman, History of American Law at 18 (cited in note 20). Mansfield wanted not only to take cases from
other courts, but also from the legislature. See Jack N. Rakove, Original Meanings: Politics and Ideas in the Making
of the Constitution 211 (1997) (describing Mansfield as engaged in a “project of defending . . . traditional modes of
adjudication against the perceived vices of legislation.”).
67
Pelly v Royal Exchange Assurance Co., 1 Burr 341, 347 (1757).
68
Oldham, Law in the Age of Mansfield at 365 (cited in note 35).
69
Id at 124.
70
Milles v Fletcher, 1 Doug 231, 232 (1779).
71
Mansfield’s application of equitable principles to commercial disputes was extremely controversial. In fact,
Mansfield’s successors – such as Kenyon, Thurlow, and Eldon – all opposed this reform, and it was not until 1873 that
the Supreme Court of Judicature was established and endowed with both equitable and legal powers. See Judicature
Act of 1873, § 24.
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the absence of a formal contract, what was owed to whom. Mansfield originally heard
the case alone in the assizes of Devonshire, but he removed it to London for a hearing
before the whole court of the King’s Bench so that he could make it “a Case” or a more
useful precedent for other merchants.72 According to Burrow’s account:
[Mansfield] said he always leaned (even where he had
himself no doubt) to make cases for the opinion of the Court;
not only for the greater satisfaction of the parties in the
particular case but to prevent other disputes, by making the
rules of law and the ground upon which they are established
certain and notorious.73
The new “truth” about commercial law could be discovered only by an exercise of
power – the power to change the discourse of the law, to change the form to adapt to the
new function. Mansfield’s success can be measured in several ways. For one, as a result
of his legal innovations, Mansfield’s court flourished. Prior to Mansfield’s discursive
change, very few commercial cases came before law courts such as the King’s Bench.74 As
a result of the consolidation of power through the focusing of legal discourse, Mansfield
created a forum that was conducive to handling commercial cases, and “business flowed
into his court.”75
The number of “commercial cases” handled by the King’s Bench increased more
rapidly than the overall growth rate of the docket as a whole. For example, the number
of commercial cases handled by the King’s Bench grew by 30 percentage points more
than all other cases during Mansfield’s time on the bench.76 More specifically, the
number of cases involving promissory notes, which are essential elements for
international trade, rose five fold from about 3 per year during the beginning of
Mansfield’s tenure to about 15 per year at the end. Cases involving “bills of exchange”
and various monetary disputes saw similar increases, while common law standards, like
trover and trespass, increased at much lower rates.77
Another measure of Mansfield’s success is his impact on legal thinkers and legal
aggregators of the day. Blackstone, the greatest of these, wrote, just nine years after
Mansfield became chief justice, that “the learning relating to . . . insurance hath of late
years been greatly improved by a series of judicial decisions, which have now established
See James Oldham, Review: From Blackstone to Bentham: Common Law versus Legislation in
Eighteenth-Century Britain, 89 Mich L Rev 1637, 1645 n 32 (1991).
73
Luke v Lyde, 2 Burr 882, 887, 97 Eng Rep 614, 617-18 (KB 1759).
74
Fifoot, Lord Mansfield at 13 n 1 (cited in note 38).
75
Heward, Lord Mansfield at 173 (cited in note 44). Other factors contributed to the success of the King’s
Bench at attracting cases to the court. Mansfield was a very hard worker and, by all accounts, operated his court with
a ruthless efficiency. See Oldham, supra note 36 at 5 (“H] e took particular care that this should not create delay or
expense to the parties; and therefore he always dictated the case to the Court, and saw it signed by counsel, before
another case was called; and always made it a condition in the rule, “that it should be set down to be argued within the
first four days of the term.”).
76
According to Heward, the number of commercial cases (for example, “goods sold and delivered,” “money,”
“promissory notes,” “policy of assurance,” and “bills of exchange”) grew 105 percent, from 217 during the period 17611765 to 444 during the period 1776-1780, where as the total number of other cases grew from 75 percent (134 to 235)
over the same periods. See id at 105-06.
77
Trover, or an action for the taking of property, went from 32 to 44, trespass from 7 to 16. See id.
72
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the law.”78 Judge Buller, writing seven years after Mansfield stepped down, described
the impact:
Before [Mansfield] we find that in Courts of law all the
evidence in mercantile cases was thrown together . . . and
they produced no established principle. From that time we
all know the great study has been to find some certain
general principles...not only to rule the particular case then
under consideration, but to serve as a guide for the future.79
Writing with more historical perspective, Oldham writes that Mansfield was one
of the two “most important judicial figures in the law of bankruptcy,”80 and the
elucidator of the fundamental legal principles of insurance and negotiable instruments,
where his chief contribution was “cogency.”81 Mansfield brought, “with considerable
success,” merchant customs “harmoniously” into the common law.82 Mansfield
accomplished the reform of commercial law—in fact, the capture of commercial
regulation by law—in part through an alternation of legal discourse.83 Clarity, which
commerce demanded as a precondition for using law courts, was achieved by changing
opinion delivery practices in a way designed to unify the judicial voice.
The change from seriatim opinions to opinions of the court was short-lived. On
the retirement of Mansfield, Lord Kenyon put an end to the practice, and the judges
returned to the practice of seriatim opinions.84 The reason for Kenyon’s decision can be
found in his theory of judging. Kenyon believed in a traditional common law approach
to deciding cases; he viewed law and equity as separate and considered an incremental
approach, rather than a broad, theoretical one, as the way to reach the best results.85
Kenyon seldom wrote opinions and rarely gave reasons for his judgments, preferring to
decide cases one at a time on the narrow facts before him, rather than announce broad
legal rules.86 This stands in stark contrast with Mansfield’s attempt to fuse common law
and equity and to announce principles of law from cases in an attempt to increase court
power.87 As one account describes Kenyon’s legacy, he is most remembered for
See 2 William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England *461.
Lickbarrow v Mason, 2 TR 63, 74; 100 ER 35 (1787).
80
Oldham, Law in the Age of Mansfield at 107 (cited in note 35).
81
Id at 124, 163.
82
Id at 365, 368.
83
Id at 365 (“[Mansfield] strove with considerable success to absorb the customs of merchants into the
common law.”).
84
Until recently they delivered their opinions seriatim, each Lord reading aloud his judgment and the
reasons for it. The Lords no longer routinely deliver five separate opinions, although they do more frequently
announce separate opinions than our Supreme Court. J.H. Baker, Introduction to English Legal History 204-11
(1990).
85
See George T. Kenyon, The Life of Lloyd, First Lord Kenyon, Lord Chief Justice of England 391(1873)
(noting that Kenyon favored the traditional common law approach over Mansfield’s attempt to fuse law and equity
and discern abstract theories from cases); see also John Lord Campbell, The Lives of the Chief Justices of England:
From the Norman Conquest Till the Death of Lord Tenterden 96 (1874) (noting Kenyon’s preference for a traditional
common law, case-by-case approach).
86
See id at 390-91. Here we see a similarity with the views of Chief Justice Roberts and his views about the
role of the Supreme Court. Roberts also appears to be trying to innovate in opinion delivery practices to achieve his
goals, just as Kenyon did. See Part IV.
87
See id at 391 (noting that Kenyon favored the traditional common law approach over Mansfield’s); see also
Campbell, Lives of the Chief Justices of England at 96 (cited in note 85).
78
79
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“restor[ing] the simplicity and rigour of the common law.”88 These views about judicial
minimalism were known to Mansfield, who worried so much about Kenyon’s views and
the impact they would have that he lingered on the King’s Bench long after he planned
retirement in the hopes that someone other than Kenyon would be appointed to succeed
him.89 Kenyon’s restoration of seriatim persevered until very recently in all
multimember English courts.90
B.

Early American Practices

England’s long tradition of seriatim opinions crossed the Atlantic along with
much of the common law during the formative stages of American judicial
development.91 Early American jurists learned the law by studying the English common
law, and therefore adopted many of its practices and institutions. In addition, many of
the state courts were established before Mansfield’s discursive innovation, so in every
state court and in the early years of the Supreme Court, American judges continued the
practice of seriatim opinions.92
But Mansfield’s change was evident to American courts and judges, so in some
cases it was emulated. In several states, Mansfield’s practice was adopted as a way to
increase the power of the courts vis-à-vis the other branches of government. Jurists in
these states saw how Mansfield had increased the power of his court at the expense of
other forms of power, and were eager to emulate this power grab. For example, in
Virginia soon after the Revolution, Judge Edmund Pendleton became the chief judge of
the court of appeals.93 Pendleton admired Mansfield and “considered him as the greatest
luminary of law that any age had ever produced.”94 Pendleton introduced Mansfield's
practice of “making up opinions in secret & delivering them as the Oracles of the
court.”95
This practice was widely criticized by Thomas Jefferson and other Republicans.
Due to this political pressure, upon the ascension of Judge Spencer Roane to Judge
Pendleton’s seat on the bench some years later, the practice ceased and the tradition of
seriatim opinions was quickly reinstated.96 Roane shared Jefferson’s view about the role
Id.
See Kenyon, The Life of Lloyd at 166 (cited in note 85).
90 The Law Lords, who serve as the Supreme Court of Great Britain in some cases, routinely delivered
opinions seriatim, with each of the five judges announcing an individual judgment with reasons. See Louis BlomCooper & Gavin Drewry, Final Appeal: A Study of the House of Lords in Its Judicial Capacity 81-82, 523 (1972). This
practice recently waned. See also Paterson, The Law Lords 109-10 (1982) (noting that the Lords no longer routinely
deliver five separate opinions).
91 Friedman, History of American Law at 112 (cited in note 20) (“To fill the gap [in American law at the
beginning], English materials were used, English reports cited, English judges quoted as authority.”).
92 See Scott D. Gerber, ed, Seriatim: The Supreme Court Before John Marshall (1998); see also David P.
Currie, Review of Seriatim: The Supreme Court Before John Marshall, 105 Am Hist Rev 1301, 1301 (2000) (noting
that “the justices of the time deliver[ed] their opinions seriatim.”).
93 Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Justice William Johnson (Oct. 27, 1822), in Merrill D. Peterson, ed,
Thomas Jefferson: Writings 1460-63 (1984).
94 Id. Mansfield was a hero to many early colonial lawyers, so it is not surprising that his experiment with
unanimous, anonymous opinions would be something they were willing to try. See Friedman, History of American
Law at 109 (cited in note 20) (“One of the cultural heroes of the American legal elite was England’s Lord Mansfield.”).
95 Id.
96 See Donald G. Morgan, The Origin of Supreme Court Dissent, 3 William & Mary Quart 353, 354 (1953)
(“In Virginia. . . Judge Pendleton, taking Mansfield as his model, had instituted the secret, unanimous opinion in the
state bench; his successor, Judge Roane, had abolished the practice.”).
88
89
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of the judiciary, which is best expressed in a letter he sent to Roane after the decision in
Marbury v. Madison: “The constitution, on this hypothesis, is a mere thing of wax in
the hands of the judiciary, which they may twist, and shape into any form they please.”97
Thomas Jefferson’s role in returning to seriatim opinions in Virginia courts is not
surprising, because he was a vocal critic of courts and the threat to democracy an
aggrandizement of judicial power posed.98 This battle against Judge Pendleton in
Virginia foreshadowed a battle with John Marshall over the same issue regarding the
way the Supreme Court delivered opinions. In fact, this single issue would become one
of the predominant political issues of the age, embroiling the nation’s legal system for a
decade and threatening the political stability of the young nation.99 The winners of the
battle—Marshall and the Federalists—would use their victory over the form of legal
discourse to build much of what we recognize as the American legal system. The
Supreme Court and its relation with the other branches of government looks the way it
does today because of Marshall’s ability to carry the day with respect to how legal
opinions should be issued from the bench.
Jefferson praised the seriatim system of announcing the law for four reasons: (1)
it increased transparency and led to more accountability; (2) it showed that each judge
had considered and understood the case; (3) it gave more or less weight to a precedent
based on the vote of the judges; (4) and it allowed judges in the future to overrule bad
law based on the reasoning of their predecessors.100 The overarching rationale for
Jefferson’s preference was to limit what he viewed as the undemocratic power of courts.
First, Jefferson argued for a return to seriatim opinions to increase the
transparency of the decision making process in order to reign in the power of the
judiciary. In Jefferson’s view, the practice of issuing an “opinion of the court” insulated
any single justice from criticism. In this way, “judicia[l] perversions of the Constitution
will forever be protected.”101 Opinions of the court were the shield that insulated the
justices from obloquy and perhaps even impeachment. Jefferson described the practice
of issuing opinions as an entire court without a public vote as a “most condemnable”
practice in which the justices “cook[ed] up a decision in caucus and deliver[ed] it by one
of their members as the opinion of the court, without the possibility of our knowing how
many, who, and for what reasons each member concurred.”102 In Jefferson’s opinion it
was not only the particular decisions that were to be condemned but also the process,
which “smother[ed] evidence” and allowed the justices to decide important questions
without “justify[ing] the reasons which led to their opinion.”103
Second, Jefferson worried that judges were lazy, aloof, or otherwise absent from
decision making on important legal questions. Jefferson reasoned that requiring a judge
97 Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Spencer Roane, (Sept. 6, 1819), in Paul Leicester Ford, ed, The Works of
Thomas Jefferson (1904-5).
98 See generally Richard E. Ellis, The Jeffersonian Crisis: Courts and Politics in the Young Republic (1971).
99 See generally James F. Simon, What Kind of Nation: Thomas Jefferson, John Marshall, and the Epic
Struggle to Create a United States (2003). Jefferson and Marshall battled repeatedly over the extent of judicial power
in the early Republic. See, for example, id at 285 (noting that Jefferson criticized Marshall’s opinion in Cohens v
Virginia, writing to Judge Spencer Roane: “The great object of my fear is the federal judiciary. . . . Let the eye of
vigilance never be closed.”).
100 In this final capacity, dissenting opinions act as an “antiprecedent” that allows future judges to base their
decision to overrule the previous opinion based on established legal reasoning
101 Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Pleasants (December 1821), in 10 Paul Leicester Ford, ed, The
Writings of Thomas Jefferson 198-99 (1892-99).
102 Id.
103 Id.
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to write out his argument for each case would provide sufficient incentive for each judge
adequately to consider the legal merits of the case. Jefferson wrote:
Let [each judge] prove by his reasoning that he has read the
papers, that he has considered the case, that in the
application of the law to it, he uses his own judgment
independently and unbiased by party views and personal
favor or disfavor.104
Third, Jefferson wrote that multiple opinions not only “communicated [the law]
by [the judges] several modes of reasoning, it showed whether the judges were
unanimous or divided, and gave accordingly more or less weight to the judgment as a
precedent.”105 Jefferson wanted a vote. “Why should not every judge be asked his
opinion, and give it from the bench, if only by yea or nay? . . . it would show whether the
opinions were unanimous or not and thus settle more exactly the weight of their
authority.”106
This practice of dissent by vote only was occasionally practiced in the early years
of the Court107 and has been advocated by some modern commentators.108 To Jefferson,
who was fearful of the aggrandizement of power in the judiciary,109 this would allow the
legislature or other courts to respond appropriately to the decision—follow it, evade it,
or bypass it with legislation or constitutional amendment—based on the “strength” of
the opinion. Dissent, with or without opinion, would serve this function.
Finally, Jefferson acknowledged that temporal communication between current
and future judges allowed for bad law to be overturned more easily.110 Jefferson knew of
English cases in which decisions had occasionally been overruled based on “dissents” in
previous seriatim opinions. Jefferson acknowledged this when he wrote that “[i]t
sometimes happened too that when there were three opinions against one, the
reasoning of the one was so much the most cogent as to become afterwards the law of
the land.”111 This is the most powerful justification for dissent. In fact, Jefferson was
foreshadowing to an extent the future of the Supreme Court and the power of dissenting
opinions when he called for this sort of deliberation from judge to judge across time. To
take just two of the many examples from Supreme Court history, dissents in cases such
104 Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Justice William Johnson (March 4, 1823), in 7 Henry A. Washington,
ed, The Writings of Thomas Jefferson 278-79 (1853-54).
105 Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Justice William Johnson (Oct. 27, 1822), in Merrill D. Peterson, ed,
Thomas Jefferson: Writings 1460-63 (1990).
106 Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Justice William Johnson (Jun. 6, 1823), in 7, Henry A. Washington, ed,
Writings of Thomas Jefferson at 293-98 (cited in note 100).
107 For example, in Herbert v Wren, 11 US 370 (1813), Justice Johnson dissented from the opinion of the
Court, but did not state his reasons.
108 Richard A. Posner, The Federal Courts: Challenge and Reform 174 (1996).
109 Thomas Jefferson strongly disagreed with Alexander Hamilton’s characterization of the judiciary as the
“least dangerous branch.” See Clinton Rossiter, ed, The Federalist Papers, (No. 78), 392-399 (Alexander Hamilton)
(1999).
110 Of course dissenting opinions can be used to overturn “good” law too.
111 Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Justice William Johnson (October 27, 1822) in Merrill D. Peterson, ed,
Thomas Jefferson: Writings 1460-63 (cited in note 100).
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as Lochner v. New York112 and Plessy v. Ferguson113 were instrumental in changing the
law many years in the future.114
For these reasons perhaps, but more likely out of tradition, the Supreme Court,
like most of the state courts, initially emulated the seriatim practice of their brethren on
England’s highest courts. The fact that decisions of the Supreme Court were issued as a
collection of separate opinions, with each justice issuing an opinion with reasons for the
decision, also limited the Court’s power. Just as in the King’s Bench before and after
Mansfield, this style of opinion delivery created substantial uncertainty and instability in
the law. 115
Calder v. Bull, a classic case from the pre-Marshall Supreme Court, demonstrates
this perfectly.116 Decided in 1798, the Court considered whether a statute passed by the
Connecticut legislature overturning a state court probate decision violated the ex post
facto clause of the federal Constitution.117 Four justices wrote opinions on the ex post
facto issue, and the holding was therefore highly confused. The modern interpretation of
the collection of seriatim opinions is that the constitutional clause applies only to
retroactive punishment, but, according to David Currie, “the practice of seriatim
opinions . . . . make[s] it difficult to say that this was the holding of the Court . . . .”118
Currie goes on to conclude that “Calder illustrates the uncertainty that can arise when
each Justice writes separately . . .,”119 and that “[t]he practice of seriatim opinions . . . .
weakened the force of the [Court’s] decisions.”120
The result of this practice was a weak and divided Court unable to assert any real
authority.121 Although the Federalists, including the first chief justice, John Jay, wanted
to assert the Court’s power to ensure the supremacy of federal law, Anti-Federalist
antipathy toward the federal judiciary continued to dominate the political scene.122
The weakness of the Court was demonstrated by the negative reception of many
of its early opinions. Characteristic of the hostility to the Court during this period was
the reaction of the Anti-Federalists to the Court’s opinion in Chisholm v Georgia.123
Lochner v New York, 198 US 45 (1905).
Plessy v Ferguson, 163 US 537 (1896).
114 The overruling of laissez-faire constitutionalism based on Justice Holmes’s dissent in Lochner was the
first time in Supreme Court history that a fundamental jurisprudential doctrine was overruled on the basis of a prior
dissenting opinion. Similarly, it was Justice Harlan’s lone dissent in Plessy that would later provide much of the
eloquent ammunition against “separate but equal” laws. With the words, “the Constitution is color blind, and neither
knows nor tolerates classes among citizens,” Harlan set the stage for Brown v Board of Education, 347 US 483
(1954), and much of the civil rights movement. This is the power of dissent, for good or bad.
115 As noted by Professor David Currie, seriatim opinions may be beneficial in that they may provide more
information germane to predicting future outcomes. See David P. Currie, The Constitution in the Supreme Court: The
First Hundred Years, 1789-1888 14, n 61 (1985) (“Yet seriatim opinions actually may give us a better basis for
predicting later decisions.”).
116 3 US 386 (1798).
117 Id at 387 (interpreting article I, section 10).
118 Currie, Constitution in the Supreme Court at 44 (cited in note 110).
119 Id at 45.
120 Id at 55.
121 Furthermore, the circuit riding duties of the justices eroded the spirit and moral of the Court, contributing
to its ineffectiveness. These duties were especially draining of the justices’ energy because of the difficulty of traveling
during this era. When John Jay referred to a lack of “energy” on the Court, it was riding circuit that was the likely
culprit. Thus Congress, state legislatures, and state courts were the dominant policy makers during this period.
122 See, for example, Ellis, Jeffersonian Crisis at 12 (cited in note 94) (“Throughout George Washington’s
first administration the federal judiciary tried to avoid becoming engaged in political controversies or becoming
entangled in questions outside its immediate jurisdiction.”).
123 Chisholm v Georgia, 2 US 419 (1793).
112
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Chisholm held that a state was not immune to suit by a private citizen in federal court.124
Legislators in Georgia responded to this decision by introducing a constitutional
amendment to restrict the power of federal courts to hear suits against states brought by
citizens of other states. This amendment quickly became the Eleventh Amendment to
the Constitution.125 With this severe blow to the institutional power of the Court, Chief
Justice Jay abandoned his leadership of the Court in order to become governor of New
York.126 When asked by President John Adams to resume his duties in 1800, Jay refused
on the grounds that the Court lacked any prestige or authority and would be unable to
earn the “public confidence and respect.”127
Following Jay’s departure and the brief leadership of John Rutledge,128 Oliver
Ellsworth was appointed as chief justice. Ellsworth was an advocate of a stronger central
government. In order to increase federal power, Chief Justice Ellsworth attempted to
initiate a policy of handing down opinions per curiam—anonymous and unanimous
opinions that would emulate Mansfield’s opinion of the court. Ellsworth believed that by
issuing decisions that would speak for the Court as a whole without dissent, the power of
the Court, and thereby the power of the national government, would be increased. This
reform was unsuccessful in part, because of the lack of political will on the part of those
opposed to seriatim opinions, in part because Ellsworth’s tenure as chief justice was
brief due to illness, and undoubtedly for other reasons as well.129 The seed, however, that
would allow the growth of national power had been sowed.
When Ellsworth left office, the future of the Court was not clear. This was in part
because the Supreme Court’s very existence was questioned at the Founding. Although
eventually established as a tri-equal branch of government, the creation of a national
court was contested at the Constitutional Convention of 1787. The delegates realized the
need for a stronger national government than existed under the Articles of
Confederation but many representatives considered the existing state courts as
sufficient for interpreting national laws and thought the federal judiciary to be a
potential “source of tyranny.”130
In the end, Federalists, who envisioned a national judiciary to settle interstate
disputes, were victorious.131 The Supreme Court was their reward. By modern standards
this was a substantial expression of national power, but for the first decade of its
existence it remained untapped as the Supreme Court was largely ignored by lawyers,
Id.
US Const Amend XI (“The judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit
in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by citizens of another state, or by citizens
or subjects of any foreign state.”). This was one of only two constitutional amendments that was adopted explicitly to
repudiate a Supreme Court decision—the other being the 16th Amendment (federal income tax) which was in response
to the Supreme Court’s decision in Pollock v Farmers’ Loan, 158 US 601 (1895), which declared the federal income
tax of 1894 unconstitutional.
126 Similarly, Robert H. Harrison refused an appointment to the Court in 1789 to become chancellor of
Maryland. See Friedman, History of American Law at 133 (cited in note 20).
127 Richard Morris, John Jay, the Nation, and the Court (1967). Jay “left the bench perfectly convinced that
under a system so defective it would not obtain the energy, weight, and dignity which are essential to its affording due
support to the national government, nor acquire the public confidence and respect which, as a court of laws resort of
the justice of the nation, it should possess.” 4 The Correspondence and Public Papers of John Jay 285 (1893).
128 John Rutledge was appointed by President Washington in 1795. Rutledge participated in two cases as
chief justice before his nomination was defeated in the Senate in December of 1795.
129 See William G. Brown, The Life of Oliver Ellsworth (1905).
130 See Rakove, Original Meanings at 186 (cited in note 67) (describing the position of the Anti-Federalists
as articulated by “Brutus,” a New York writer responding to the Federalist Papers).
131 See id.
124
125
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politicians, and the public. The Court was not provided with a chambers and the job of
chief justice was refused by several prominent statesmen. According to the first chief
justice, John Jay, in its first ten years the Court “lacked energy, weight, and dignity.”132
Everything changed with the appointment of John Marshall as chief justice in 1801.
C.

The Era of Unanimity

In 1800, the year of Ellsworth’s retirement from the Court, the Federalists, who
had dominated politics since 1789, were on the way out. The Federalists were advocates
of a strong central government, were skeptical of state powers, and distrusted direct
democracy. By contrast, Jefferson’s Republicans emphasized the decentralized authority
of the states and the people. With the defeat of Federalist John Adams by Jefferson in
the election of 1800, the power of the central government seemed to be on the wane.
The outgoing Federalists, however, were not content to entrust the Constitution to
Jefferson’s Republicans.
Realizing that they were about to lose control of the only two branches of
government with any power, the Federalists looked to secure control of the third branch
as a possible bulwark of national power. The branch that they seized, however, needed
serious reform in order to be strong enough to counteract, or at least curtail, the power
of the new president and the Republican-controlled Congress. During its first 16 terms,
the Court heard only about 60 cases, only about 10 were of any significance, and when
the government moved to Washington in 1800, the Court had “no library, no office
space, no clerks or secretaries,” and heard cases on the first floor of the Capitol,
“adjacent to the main staircase.”133 For these reasons, and because the power of the
Court to interpret the Constitution was not clear at this time, Alexander Hamilton
described the judiciary as “beyond comparison the weakest of the three branches.”134
1.

The Marshall Court

The Federalist reform came in two forms: the outgoing Federalist Congress
passed the Judiciary Act of 1801, and lame duck President Adams appointed John
Marshall as chief justice. Each of these acts was intended not merely to secure Federalist
control of the Court, but to increase the power of the Court at the expense of the
legislative and executive branches.
The Judiciary Act doubled the number of circuit courts (from three to six) and
created 16 new judgeships.135 This was intended to do two things to increase Federalist
control over the judiciary. First, it gave outgoing President Adams a chance to populate
the federal courts with Federalists. Second, it eliminated the circuit-riding duties of
Supreme Court justices, who previously had sat on both the Supreme Court and on the
132 Morris, John Jay at 81 (cited in note 123). See also, Robert P. Frankel, Jr., Judicial Beginnings: The
Supreme Court in the 1790s, 4 History Compass 1102, 1104 (2006).
133 Jean Edward Smith, John Marshall: Definer of a Nation (1996).
134 Clinton Rossiter, ed, The Federalist Papers (No. 78), at 464-65 (Alexander Hamilton) (1999).
135 The Sixth Circuit only got one additional judge. The Act also created 10 new district courts, overseen by
existing district court judges, who were federalists. These were the famous “midnight judges.” See David R. Stras,
Why Supreme Court Justices Should Ride Circuit Again, 91 Minn L Rev 1710, 1719- 21 (2007) (describing the
Judiciary Act of 1801 as the “Midnight Judges Act”).
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three circuit courts. This was designed to increase the Court’s prestige and to increase
the desirability of being a Supreme Court justice.
Riding circuit was a major impediment to an energetic and collegial Court.
Relieved of their duties to travel and sit on other courts, the justices could live together
in Washington, develop strong relationships, and work in a more united way on
important issues, giving the Court the “energy” that Jay claimed it lacked. This reform
was not effective, however, because the Republican-controlled Congress repealed the
Act in 1802, and Supreme Court justices continued to ride circuit until 1869.
The Federalist plan to control the judiciary therefore rested principally on the
appointment of John Marshall as chief justice of the United States. This was not lost on
Marshall. The day Jefferson was inaugurated, Marshall wrote to Charles Cotesworth
Pinckney: “Of the importance of the judiciary at all times, but more especially the
present I am fully impressed. I shall endeavor in the new office to which I am called not
to disappoint my friends.”136
Marshall was an “ardent nationalist.” He wrote that “I was confirmed in the habit
of considering America as my country and Congress as my government. . .. I had
imbibed these sentiments so thoroughly that they constituted a part of my being.”137
Despite his firm belief in the national government, Marshall was a reluctant political
actor. Marshall entered politics following Shays’ Rebellion of 1786 only because he felt
that the nation was in danger of collapse.138 Marshall viewed Republican control of the
government as dangerous to his conception of the nation. The “gloomy views”139 of
Federalists upon Jefferson’s ascendancy were captured in a letter Marshall wrote to a
Congressman from Massachusetts at the time: “I feel that real Americanism is on the
ebb.”140 Marshall carried his national spirit to the Court.
Unlike the failed attempt with the Judiciary Act, this tactic of the Federalists
proved to be a tremendous success. Marshall found a ready historical example of how
courts could increase their power in the experience of Lord Mansfield, who was a
“cultural hero of the American legal elite” at that time, and whose reform in the early
1760s was recent history for the Founders.141 Marshall increased the power of the Court
vis-à-vis the other branches of government by dramatically altering the way the Court
decided and announced its opinions, just as Mansfield had done, and for the same
reasons.
In an expression of raw political power, Marshall abandoned the tradition of
seriatim opinions and established an “Opinion of the Court” that would speak for all
justices through a single voice.142 This change was viewed as an “act [] of audacity” and
“assumption [] of power.”143 Marshall used his leadership skills and the power of
136 Letter from John Marshall to Charles Cotesworth Pinckney (Mar. 4, 1801), in 6 The Papers of John
Marshall 89 (1990).
137 John Stokes Adams, ed, John Marshall: An Autobiographical Sketch 9-10 (1937).
138 Smith, John Marshall at 5 (cited in note 129).
139 J. Beveridge Jr., The Life of John Marshall 15 (1919) (“Of all the leading Federalists, John Marshall was
the only one who refused to ‘bawl,’ at least in the public ear; and yet, as we have seen and shall again find, he
entertained the gloomy views of his political associates.”).
140 Letter from John Marshall to Harrison Gray Otis (Aug. 5, 1800), in 4 The Papers of John Marshall, at
204-05.
141 Friedman, History of American Law at 109 (cited in note 20).
142 See, for example, Rehnquist, The Supreme Court at 40 (cited in note 34) (“Marshall, in what one of his
biographers calls ‘an act of audacity,’ changed this tradition in the Supreme Court of the United States so that an
opinion for the Court was delivered by only one of the justices.”).
143 Beveridge, Life of John Marshall at 16 (cited in note 135).
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persuasion to convince the other five members of the Court that they should abandon
the practice of issuing seriatim opinions. Cases were now decided by private conference
in which the justices reached a compromise position. An opinion, commanding an
unknown vote, was drafted by an anonymous justice and then issued under the name of
“John Marshall” who signed for the Court: “For the first time the Chief Justice
disregarded the custom of delivery of opinions by the Justices seriatim, and, instead,
calmly assumed the function of announcing, himself, the views of that tribunal.”144
Marshall’s great discursive revolution, which would cause fundamental shifts in the
power of American government, began boldly with the Court’s decision in Talbot v.
Seeman.145
Although the question presented in Talbot was on its face a simple admiralty
issue regarding payments owed in cases of salvage, the context of the case required the
Court to take sides in a political debate about a raging “quasi-war” with France. The ship
involved in the case was the “Amelia,” which was owned by Seeman, a resident of a
neutral city-state in the war between England and France. The ship, an armed merchant
ship carrying some English goods, had been captured by the French and then recaptured
by Talbot, the captain of the American frigate “Constitution.”146 Talbot sued seeking
salvage rights—half the value of the cargo. Seeman argued that the ship was neutral and
in no danger of being condemned by the French, and that there was no service rendered
and therefore no salvage rights owed.
The controversy required the Court not only to decide the narrow question about
whether the risk of condemnation was sufficient to justify payment to Talbot, but also to
interpret conflicting congressional and presidential actions regarding America’s role in
the quasi-war with France. In short, the Court was being asked to make a highly political
statement in the guise of a salvage case.
The case required the Court to decide two questions: (1) was the seizure by Talbot
legal, and (2) did Talbot provide a valuable service to Seeman. Federalists, who were
proponents of the war with France, argued strongly for Talbot; Republicans, who
wanted to avoid foreign entanglements and defended neutral shipping, supported
Seeman.147 The Court answered both questions in the affirmative, but did so in a manner
designed to placate everyone, thereby allowing the Court to increase its power. Marshall
convinced the other justices that:
[i]f a complex, politically charged case like Talbot could be
resolved with a single opinion, not only would the holding
enjoy greater legitimacy, but the identity of the Supreme
Court as [the] nation’s highest tribunal would become
manifest and its prestige would be enhanced enormously.148
The Court’s decision reveals not only the compromise the Court needed to reach
to speak with one voice but also the need to prevent a political backlash against the
Id.
5 US 1 (1801).
146 This is the famous “Old Ironsides.” See http://www.ussconstitution.navy.mil.
147 To add to the mystique of the case, on appeal from a district court ruling for Talbot, Federalist Alexander
Hamilton represented Talbot, while Republican, and Hamilton’s archenemy and eventual murderer, Aaron Burr
represented Seeman.
148 Smith, John Marshall at 293 (cited in note 129).
144
145
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Court’s new power play. The Court held for Talbot (a victory for the Federalists), but it
reduced Talbot’s salvage claim to one sixth of the ship’s value (down from the traditional
half) and then allowed Seeman to deduct his costs from this amount (a rarity), making
the damages nominal (a victory for the Republicans). Marshall established the power of
the Court to decide whether congressional statutes authorized seizure of vessels of
foreign powers and what role the executive had in foreign policy,149 while insulating the
decision (and thus his assertion of power) from critics. Acceptance of the decision,
which Jefferson and the Republicans did reluctantly, opened the door for the Court to
assert, just two years later, the power of judicial review in Marbury v. Madison.
Thus was born the “Opinion of the Court,” which, in a revised form, survives to
this day. The Court now had weight and dignity as well as energy, and it was not subject
to political sniping. John Jay’s challenge was met, and the Court was able to assert itself
as a tri-equal branch of government.150 This innovation – a paradigmatic shift in legal
discourse – initiated a new era of Supreme Court power. The result was a focusing of the
power of the national judiciary, and consequently, a shift in the locus of power from the
nonlegal to the legal, and from the states to the federal government. This evolution in
the function of law was enabled through a change in the form in which law is established
and delivered. In 1801, the form of legal discourse transmogrified to adapt to Law’s new
role in the emerging modern world.
***
During his first ten years as chief justice, Marshall “wrote” 90 percent of the
opinions for the Court.151 The only opinions that were not issued under his name during
this period were in cases in which Marshall tried the case below while riding circuit,152
had a personal interest in the case,153 or dissented from his fellow justices.154 Although
Marshall dissented occasionally, he generally led by example and acquiesced to the
compromise position. This is demonstrated by comparing Marshall with his successors.
As shown on Table A, in the history of the Court, Marshall is the chief justice least likely
to dissent.
TABLE A: Dissenting Behavior of Chief Justices

Chief Justice
Marshall

Dates of
Service
1801-1835

Number of Cases
1187

Number of
Chief Justice
Dissenting
Opinions
3

Dissent
Proportion
(percent)
0

149 In an oft quoted passage, the Court wrote: “The whole powers of war being, by the Constitution of the
United States, vested in Congress, the Acts of that body can alone be resorted to as our guides in this enquiry.” See
Talbot v Seeman, 5 US at 28.
150 See William J. Brennan Jr., In Defense of Dissents, 37 Hastings L J at 427 (“This change in custom at the
time consolidated the authority of the Court and aided in the general recognition of the Third Branch as co-equal
partner with the other branches. Not surprisingly, not everyone was pleased with the new practice.”).
151 Opinions were issued under Marshall’s name in all cases in 1801, 1805, and 1806; in 91 percent of cases in
1803; 89 percent in 1804; 90 percent in 1807, 83 percent in 1808; 88 percent in 1809; 73 percent in 1810; and 58
percent in 1812. Over the next 23 years, Marshall accounted for only about 40 percent of opinions. This remains about
four times as many opinions as are written by Chief Justice Rehnquist.
152 See, for example, Stuart v Laird, 5 US 299 (1803).
153 See, for example, Martin v Hunter’s Lessee, 14 US 304 (1816).
154 See, for example, Bank of the U.S. v Dandridge, 25 US 64 (1827).
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Taney
Chase
Waite
Fuller
White
Taft
Hughes
Stone
Vinson
Warren
Burger
Rehnquist
Roberts

1836-1863 1708
1864-1873 1109
1874-1887 2642
1888-1909 4866
1910-1920 2541
1921-1929
1708
1930-1940 2050
1941-1945
704
1946-1952 723
1953-1968 1772
1969-1985 2755
1986-2005 2131
2005-present 104

38
33
45
113
39
16
46
95
90
215
184
182
3

2
3
2
2
2
1
2
13
12
12
7
9
3

Source: Westlaw SCT database

Marshall’s plan was a dramatic success. From 1801 to 1835, justices filed very few
dissenting opinions from the hundreds of opinions of the Court (Figure 1), and the Court
decided such fundamental legal issues as the supremacy of federal law, judicial
review,155 the implied powers of the national government,156 the Court’s power over state
court decisions implicating federal questions,157 and federal power over interstate
commerce158 without much dispute, open challenge, or reversal by the political
branches.

Number of Dissenting Opinions

Figure 1: Dissenting Opinions in the Supreme Court
During the Marshall Court (1801-1835)

Year
Source: Westlaw Supreme Court database (SCT-OLD)

Marbury v Madison, 5 US 137 (1803).
McCulloch v Maryland, 17 US 316 (1819).
157 Martin v Hunter’s Lessee, 14 US 304 (1816) (Marshall recused himself because he was personally involved
in this case; Joseph Story wrote the opinion); Cohens v Virginia, 6 Wheaton 264 (1821).
158 Gibbons v Ogden, 22 US 1 (1824).
155

156
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In fact, it was not until 1804 when President Jefferson appointed Justice William
Johnson, who would be known as the “First Dissenter,” that the first dissenting opinion
was recorded.159 Jefferson recognized this change in discourse as a blatant attempt to
counteract the results of the congressional and presidential elections, and to increase
the power of the judiciary. “The Federalists,” he wrote “retreated into the Judiciary as a
stronghold, the tenure of which renders it difficult to dislodge them.”160 In order to
counter the lack of political accountability in the Court, Jefferson urged Republican
appointed judges to revert to the practice of seriatim opinions.161 Most famously, in a
series of letters between Jefferson and Johnson in 1822, the former urged the latter to
dissent in nearly every case. This was somewhat successful at breaking Marshall’s grip
on the Court. As shown on Figure 1, the number of dissenting opinions increased in the
later years of the Marshall Court as Jefferson appointees began to disrupt the practice of
unanimity. After ten years of near unanimity, the next 25 years saw an increased
number of dissenting opinions.
Notwithstanding the increase in the number of dissents, there was still only one
dissent in about every twenty-five cases decided during the Marshall Court, the lowest
percentage in the history of the Court. The dissenting opinions of the Marshall Court are
listed in the Appendix. Notably, of the 52 dissenting opinions issued during the Marshall
Court, Jefferson appointees William Johnson and Brockholst Livingston authored
almost 60 percent.162 Although law at the time of the Marshall Court was considered less
political than it is today, even at this early time dissent was seen as a political act. Still,
Johnson sided with Marshall far more often than not, joining the Opinion of the Court
96 percent of the time.163 According to legal historian Lawrence Friedman, even
Johnson was under Marshall’s “spell.”164
Although Marshall effectively controlled the discourse of the Court, he did not
dominate its “thinking.”165 Instead, Marshall effectively led the Court. Marshall
established and maintained an atmosphere during conferences that was conducive to
compromise. After a decision was reached, Marshall managed the public and political
perception through the issuance of unanimous and anonymous opinions. The opinions
carried greater authority and individual justices were shielded from outrage or
impeachment charges.166
159 See Herbert v Wren, 11 US 370 (1813). Johnson’s first dissent was tentative: the report states that he
dissented but “did not state his reasons.” Id at 382.
160 Charles Warren, The Supreme Court in United States History Vol 1, 193 (1926).
161 For example, many of Jefferson’s letters cited above were correspondence between Jefferson and Justice
Johnson in which Jefferson extolled the virtues of traditional seriatim opinions.
162 Johnson and Livingston (Jefferson appointees) authored 20 and 9 respectively; Thompson (Monroe
appointee) authored 6; Baldwin and McLean (Jackson appointees) authored 6 and 2 respectively; Story and Duvall
(Madison appointees) authored 4 and 1; Chase (Washington appointee) authored 3; Marshall and Washington
(Adams appointees) authored 3 and 1.
163 Johnson heard approximately 977 cases during his time on the Court (1805-1833); he dissented or wrote
seriatim 39 times (or in 4% of cases). See David G. Morgan, The Origin of Supreme Court Dissent, 10 William & Mary
Quart 353, 377 (1953).
164 Friedman, History of American Law at 128 (cited in note 20).
165 Herbert A. Johnson, The Chief Justiceship of John Marshall, 1801-1835 51 (1997) (noting that there is
“undeniable evidence that Chief Justice Marshall did not dominate his colleagues; the domination theory has been so
thoroughly refuted that Professor David Currie referred to it as the story of ‘John Marshall and the six dwarfs.’”).
166 Although the call to impeach a Supreme Court justice for a particular decision seems outrageous today,
during this era, such charges were frequently threatened and occasionally levied against judges. For example, in 1805
Associate Justice Samuel Chase was impeached by the House and tried in the Senate. The ground for the
impeachment was Chase’s handling of several criminal trials in which he tried to implement the Adams
Administration’s attempts to silence political foes. However, the charges against Chase were shown to be politically
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This “authority” was simply assumed by Marshall, and it has remained virtually
unquestioned for over 200 years. Many powerful individuals have tried to usurp it –
President Jefferson tried to impeach Justice Chase; President Jackson refused to
enforce decisions with which he disagreed; President Lincoln refused to enforce a writ of
habeas corpus issued by Chief Justice Taney; several presidents either increased or
proposed enlarging the Court to alter its power;167 and numerous representatives and
senators have proposed curtailing Supreme Court power through legislation168 – but
none has succeeded in undoing the institutional authority created in large part by
Marshall’s discursive change.
Marshall was able to achieve the power of unanimity and effectuate a
fundamental change in legal discourse based, at least in part, on his personal leadership
skills. Marshall was revered for his ability to lead and to relate to others. Biographers
describe him as able to “inspire confidence and trust” and “able to elicit a warm and
supportive response from others.”169 In a famous quote, fellow justice Joseph Story
responded to questions about Marshall’s motives on the Court: “I love his laugh— it is
too hearty for an intriguer.”170 Whether Marshall had a strategy or whether he was an
“intriguer,” is a question without an easy answer. Jefferson famously accused Marshall
motivated and he was acquitted in the Senate. Judge Charles Pickering was not so lucky. A Federalist judge who “had
committed no ‘high crimes and misdemeanors’” but was “a drunk, seriously deranged,” and overtly political in his
handling of cases was impeached and convicted in 1804. See Friedman, History of American Law at 129-30 (cited in
note 20). This impeachment, like that of Alexander Addison, a Federalist judge from Pennsylvania who “harangued
grand juries on political subjects” and was impeached and removed from office in 1803, was Jefferson’s attempt to
create a “bogeyman” to threaten judges into good behavior. Id at 129. Historians believe that it was largely effective,
much like Roosevelt’s “court packing plan” 150 years later. Id at 129, 132 (“The failure of [the Chase] impeachment
was not a clear-cut victory for either side. . . . The judges won independence, but at a price. Their openly political role
was reduced.”).
167 The number of Supreme Court justices was originally set at six. See Judiciary Act of 1789, 1 Stat 73 (1789).
Changes in the number of justices have been made or proposed many times for political reasons. For example, when
Jefferson was elected in 1800, the outgoing Federalist Congress reduced the number of justices to five, but this was
increased to six and then seven by Republicans in Congress to give Jefferson two appointments. Andrew Jackson got
two appointments when the Court grew to nine in 1837. Anti-slavery forces increased the Court to ten, but then after
the Civil War, the Republicans reduced the number to seven to ensure Democrat Andrew Johnson would not get any
appointments. When a Republican, U.S. Grant, was elected in 1868, the Republicans gave him two new justices to
appoint, expanding the Court back to nine. His nominees quickly made an impact, voting to reverse the Court’s
recently created precedent in the Legal Tender cases. More recently, Franklin Delano Roosevelt’s Court-packing plan
did not succeed in increasing the number of justices, but it did cause enough justices to reverse opposition to the New
Deal to achieve the results intended.
168 For example, Senator Charles Sumner of Massachusetts was concerned that the Supreme Court would
hold Congress’ reconstruction laws unconstitutional, so he introduced a bill in 1869 that would dramatically curtail
the Supreme Court’s jurisdiction: “The judicial power extends only to cases between party and party . . . and does not
include the President or Congress, or any of their acts . . . and all such acts are valid and conclusive on the matters to
which they apply; . . . and no allegation or pretence of the invalidity thereof shall be excuse or defense for any neglect,
refusal, or failure to perform any duty in regard to them." See Congressional Globe, 41st Congress, 2nd Session, at
2895 (1869). Senator Lyman Trumbell of Illinois proposed a similar, albeit more narrow, limitation on the Court in
1868 and 1869, arguing that the reconstruction acts were “political in character” and the Court had no jurisdiction to
pass upon them. See 40th Congress, 2nd Session, at 1204, 1428, 1621 (1868); see also 41st Congress, 2nd Session, at
3, 27, 45, 96, 152, 167 (1869). Senator Richard M. Johnson of Kentucky proposed giving the Senate appellate
jurisdiction in cases in which the government was a party, allowing the Senate to effectively overrule Supreme Court
opinions. See Annals of Congress, 17th Congress, 1st Session, Dec 12, 1821, Jan 14 and 15, 1822. In response to the
Supreme Court’s rejection of much progressive legislation in the pre-New Deal period, Senator Robert M. LaFollette,
Sr. of Wisconsin proposed a constitutional amendment that would allow two thirds of the Senate to overrule any
decision of the Court. See Congressional Record, 67th Con2nd at 9073, Reprint of LaFollette's speech before the
American Federation of Labor
169 Johnson, Chief Justiceship at 121 (cited in note 161).
170 Smith, John Marshall at 291 (cited in note 129).
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of deliberately manipulating the Constitution to achieve his own ends,171 and some
modern observes agree, viewing his early opinions as highly political.172
Marshall had nationalist tendencies, but so did his predecessor Chief Justice
Ellsworth and many of his successors. But only Marshall was able to implement these
tendencies so effectively in practice. What made Marshall different was his ability to
assert the type of personal leadership necessary to achieve the goal of strong national
power. But there were many “conditions of possibility” that enabled this change.
Marshall and his fellow justices were able to achieve considerable unanimity because of
their similar socioeconomic backgrounds. Justices were drawn entirely from the cadre
of practicing lawyers or the government elite. All of the justices were propertied
gentlemen and each had a strong sense of nationalism, a concern for private property
rights, and accepted traditional principles of the legal profession of the era.173 In
addition, for the first several decades of Court history, the justices all lived in the same
boardinghouse in Washington. This living arrangement added to the collegial nature of
the Court and helped foster similar views among the justices. Whatever the exact mix of
reasons, Marshall was able to increase the power of the Court in no small part through a
change in the discourse of the Court.
2.

The Continuing Tradition

Unlike the experience with the “opinion of the court” in England, in this country
the unanimity consensus continued to a great extent even after Marshall left the Court
in 1835. Although the number of separate opinions increased slightly after Marshall
resigned, the practice of unanimity dominated the Supreme Court for over 100 years
(Figure 2).
171 “In Marshall’s hands the law is nothing more than an ambiguous text to be explained by his sophistry into
any meaning which may subserve his personal malice.” Letter from Jefferson to Madison (May 25, 1810) in M. Smith,
ed, The Republic of Letters: The Correspondence Between Thomas Jefferson and James Madison 64 (1995).
172 See, for example, Akhil Reed Amar, Marbury, Section 13, and the Original Jurisdiction of the Supreme
Court, 56 U Chi L Rev 443 (1989); John V Orth, Book Review: John Marshall and the Rule of Law, 49 SC L Rev 633,
636 (1998) (“Marshall did seem to have a strategic vision of forcing . . . the national government to govern the
nation.”).
173 Johnson, Chief Justiceship at 96-97 (cited in note 161).
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The unanimity discourse of Marshall changed over time. By 1814, Marshall did
not sign the vast majority of opinions, but instead authored only about 50 percent. This
was still significant (compared to the approximately 15 percent of opinions authored by
Chief Justice Rehnquist during his tenure), but it represented a changing of the guard.
Furthermore, Jefferson appointees, who were hostile to Marshall, were beginning to
assert their power, and other factors led to a decline in the collegiality of the Court. For
example, by 1827, under pressure from Republicans and because newly appointed
justices established their own residences in Washington, the “boardinghouse Court” was
abolished. This undermined attempts to maintain unanimity.174 As factions developed
within the Court, the percent of cases with a dissenting opinion increased from four
percent under Marshall to nearly ten percent under his immediate successors.
Despite these changes, the period from the end of Marshall’s tenure in 1835 to
the beginning of Harlan Fiske Stone’s appointment in 1941 saw little change in the
discourse of Supreme Court opinions.175 Table B shows the frequency of dissenting
opinions during each chief justiceship.
TABLE B: Dissenting Proclivity
Chief Justice

Dates of Service

Marshall
Taney
Chase
Waite

1801-1835
1836-1863
1864-1873
1874-1887

Percent of opinions
with a Dissent
4
9
9
6

Id at 110-11.
“Yet, neither [Justice] Johnson nor any alter Justices could or would undo Marshall’s work. Doctrine
changed; personalities and blocs clashed on the Supreme Court; power contended with power; but these struggles all
took place within the fortress that Marshall had built.” Friedman, History of American Law at 134 (cited in note 20).
174
175
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Fuller
White
Taft
Hughes
Stone
Vinson
Warren
Burger
Rehnquist
Roberts

1888-1909
1910-1920
1921-1929
1930-1940
1941-1945
1946-1952
1953-1968
1969-1985
1986-2005
2005-Present

7
5
7
9
27
48
50
59
56
47

Until 1941, the rate of dissent remained relatively constant at less than ten
percent. Two primary factors seem to explain this result. First, the traits and leadership
of the chief justices who succeeded Marshall; and, second, the legal atmosphere of the
period and the type of cases heard by the Court.
As for leadership, each chief justice from Marshall to Stone came from similar
backgrounds,176 had remarkable leadership skills, and was committed to unanimity.
Melville Fuller (1888-1910) was an “excellent social leader . . . blessed with conciliatory
and diplomatic traits.”177 Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes characterized Fuller as a great
chief justice because of his ability to conduct the business of the Court without much
dissent.178 Likewise, Chief Justice Edward White (1910-1920) was a former Senate
majority leader blessed with a “genial temperament and adroit logrolling skills that
permitted him to mend fences and reinforce consensus norms in Court.”179 Following
White was the legendary consensus builder, William Howard Taft (1921-1929). Taft
“hated dissenting opinions, wrote very few himself, and made every effort to dissuade
others from writing them.”180 Taft explained, “I don’t approve of dissents generally, for I
think in many cases where I differ from the majority, it is more important to stand by
the Court and give its judgment weight than merely to record my individual dissent
where it is better to have the law certain than to have it settled either way.”181 Taft
imparted this tendency to his successor Charles Evans Hughes (1930-1940). Hughes
discouraged dissent in order to shield internal divisions from public view.182In a
personal letter to another justice, Hughes explained why he would join the majority
opinion despite his strong reservations about the outcome: “I choke a little at
swallowing your analysis; still I do not think it would serve any useful purpose to expose
my views.”183
In terms of case characteristics, most of the cases heard by the Court during this
period were straightforward common law or admiralty cases that were less contentious
176 Marshall, like his successors, was first and foremost a lawyer. He spent a career representing business
interests in Virginia, and, like most contemporaries of the bench and bar, was a significant property owner. See
Charles F. Hobson, The Great Chief Justice: John Marshall and the Rule of Law 74 (1996).
177 Sheldon Goldman, Constitutional Law and Supreme Court Decision-Making 178 (1982).
178 Id at 178-79.
179 James Watts, Edward Douglas White, in 3 Leon Friedman & Fred Israel, eds, The Justices of the United
States Supreme Court 1789-1969 (1969).
180 Edward White, The American Judicial Tradition 180 (1976).
181 Walter Murphy, Elements of Judicial Strategy 61 (1964).
182 Henry Abraham, The Judicial Process 230 (1986).
183 Id at 224.
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than most modern cases.184 Talbot was the rare admiralty case that posed contentious
political questions. Most Supreme Court cases were not like Talbot. Most of the Court’s
decisions were able to garner consensus in part because the common law provided
numerous precedents. Federal courts did not have general federal question jurisdiction
to hear matters arising under the Constitution and laws of the United States until 1875.
It was not until after Erie in 1938, when federal common law was abandoned, that the
Court would routinely handle difficult, and politically sensitive, constitutional issues.185
This change from a common law court of last resort to a constitutional court caused a
dramatic increase in the percentage of cases with a dissenting opinion. In its first 150
years, the Court rarely dealt with disputes involving civil liberties, as we understand
them today. The first cases to uphold civil liberties were Ex parte Milligan186 and Ex
parte,187 which were not decided until 1866. There would be more contentious cases
during the next few decades, including the upholding of “separate but equal laws” in
Plessy v. Ferguson188 in 1896 and free speech cases during World War I,189 but the
Court’s cases were generally not politically contentious in the modern sense until the
New Deal.
D.

The Rise of Dissent

The long-standing practice of virtual unanimity was abandoned as abruptly as it
was begun. With the ascendancy of Harlan Fiske Stone to chief justice in 1941, the Court
began a trend of writing separate opinions in most cases (Figure 2). Several possibilities
may explain this change, but one stands out. Stone tolerated and even encouraged
dissent out of personal preference and practice. Stone was the first academic appointed
to hold the position of chief justice, and this background made him more likely to
encourage open debate. This academic pedigree combined with his personality, which
favored debate and confrontation, were evident in his frequent dissents as an associate
justice. This proclivity to dissent continued when Stone was appointed chief justice—
Stone was much more likely to dissent himself compared to his predecessors and
remains the chief justice most likely to dissent (Table A). Just as chief justices from
Marshall to Taft encouraged unanimity by their own practice of acquiescing in opinions
184 Of the nearly 400 cases decided by the Supreme Court between 1801 and 1833, less than 50 (or about 12
percent) were “constitutional” cases according to Professor David Currie. See Currie, Constitution in the Supreme
Court at 65-193 (cited in note 110) (collecting and treating these cases; number counted by author). The most
common cases during this time were traditional common law cases: property (17 percent), admiralty/prize cases in
which the Court was an instance court (15 percent), procedure (15 percent), family law (10 percent), and contracts (9
percent). Chief Justice Rehnquist also describes 19th Century Supreme Court jurisprudence as largely run-of-the-mill
by today’s standards, noting that the Court spent considerable time during the 1860’s and 1870’s on railroad bond
cases. See Rehnquist The Supreme Court at 90-91 (cited in note 34).
185 Erie Railroad Co v Tompkins, 304 US 64 (1938). Prior to 1938, many constitutional questions of great
import were decided, but the Supreme Court docket consisted mainly of routine common law and admiralty cases.
Some of the more famous dissents of the early period arose in the tough constitutional questions. See, for example,
Lochner v New York 198 US 45 (1905), Scott v Sanford 60 US 393 (1857), and Plessy v Ferguson 163 US 537 (1896).
186 71 US 2 (1866).
187 71 US 333 (1866).
188 163 US 537 (1896).
189 See, for example, Abrams v. United States, 250 US 616 (1919) (holding that an amendment to the
Espionage Act of 1917 that made it a crime to criticize the government did not violate the First Amendment). Abrams
is no longer good law. See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 US 444 (1969) (holding that the government cannot punish
potentially inflammatory speech unless it threatens “imminent lawless action”).
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with which they did not fully agree, so did Chief Justice Stone and his successors lead by
example by issuing a substantial number of dissenting opinions themselves.
It is Stone’s leadership that scholars argue caused the end of the consensus
norm.190 For example, the most prominent study of dissent in the political science
literature, concludes that, as in the case of John Marshall and the rise of the unanimity
norm, it was the leadership of Chief Justice Stone that was most responsible for the
change.191 Other possible explanations examined by the authors were the change in
docket from mandatory to discretionary review, the shift in the type of cases argued
before the Court, the internal politics of the Court, and large-scale changes in the Court’s
personnel at the time. Let us look at some of the theories considered and rejected:
First, the authors examined the role of the Judiciary Act of 1925 and the move to
a discretionary docket. Although it is possible that this would create more dissent
because only difficult cases would be granted certiorari, the authors conclude that this
change was not responsible for the increase in dissents. They base this on the fact that
the rise in dissents did not occur until 1942, many years after passage of the Act.192 The
time gap may be sufficient evidence that the direct or only cause of the change was not
the Judiciary Act. It does not, however, eliminate the change in jurisdiction as a
“condition of possibility” that contributed to the change in discourse.
Another explanation considered and rejected by the authors was the increase in
the Supreme Court caseload. The authors reject this explanation because of timing.
Although they observe a dramatic increase in caseload results in less time to build
consensus and construct compromises, they conclude that the growth in the caseload
was not dramatic until the 1960’s, 20 years after the rise of dissent. But the authors’ data
confuse the rise in federal cases, which started in the 1960s, and the rise in the number
of Supreme Court cases, which occurred much earlier and then subsequently decreased.
The data presented in Figure 3 show a growth in Supreme Court cases following the
Civil War and then a decrease by the time of the Stone Court (1941-45).
190 Thomas Walker, et al., On the Mysterious Demise of Consensual Norms in the United States Supreme
Court, 50 J Pol 361, 362 (1988).
191 Id.
192 Id at 364-65.
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The data suggest that the change in the number of cases is inversely related to the
number of dissenting opinions. The five-fold increase in Supreme Court decisions in the
1860’s was not accompanied by an increase in dissenting opinions. By contrast, the drop
in the number of Supreme Court cases following the Judiciary Act of 1925 corresponds
well with the increase in dissenting opinions. In addition, the Rehnquist Court heard
fewer cases per year than any Court of the last 100 years, but nearly 50 percent of all
opinions had a dissent; the Roberts Court appears to be following a similar pattern. This
inverse relation suggests that it was more likely the change in the type of cases that
resulted in more dissenting opinions rather than the change in the number of cases.
The authors also briefly considered this possible explanation when they
compared the type of cases heard by the Stone Court and its predecessor, the Hughes
Court. The authors concluded that there was not a significant increase in the type of
cases they describe as “dissent prone.” But their analysis ignored the fundamental
change in the role of the Court post-Erie. By the time of Stone’s appointment as chief
justice, the Court was becoming a constitutional rather than a common law court.
Certainly, the increase in contentious cases in the 1940s made for a more fertile ground
for dissent. It was at this time that “the cutting edge debate [of] constitutional law
shifted from . . . economic regulation . . . to claims of civil liberties violations on behalf of
various kinds of dissidents.”193 The growth in dissent-prone cases was caused in part by
the fact that during this time the Court issued a series of decisions that extended the
protections of the Bill of Rights to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment.194 But
Rehnquist, The Supreme Court at 174-75 (cited in note 34).
The “incorporation” of the Bill of Rights via the Fourteenth Amendment is a controversial constitutional
question. In a recent essay, David Strauss notes that the issue “went from being a subject of intense controversy-probably the most controversial issue in constitutional law between the mid-1940s and mid-1950s, and one of the
most controversial for a decade or more thereafter--to being a completely settled issue.” See David A. Strauss,
Common Law, Common Ground, and Jefferson’s Principle, 112 Yale LJ 1717, 1746 (2003). Although the first right to
be incorporated, the Takings Clause, occurred in the late Nineteenth Century, see Chicago, Burlington & Quincy
Railway Co. v Chicago, 166 US 226 (1897), the period around Stone’s tenure saw the greatest activity of incorporation
by the Court. See Gitlow v New York, 268 US 652 (1925) (incorporating freedom of speech clause); Near v Minnesota,
283 US 697 (1931) (incorporating freedom of the press clause); Powell v Alabama, 287 US 45 (1932) (incorporating
right to assistance of counsel in capital criminal cases); DeJonge v Oregon, 299 US 353 (1937) (incorporating freedom
193

194
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like the possible causes noted above, this explanation cannot be viewed in a vacuum.
Both the law and society were in great flux at this time. The rise of New Deal
constitutionalism replaced the long history of Lochner constitutionalism, and Holmes’s
dissent in Lochner came to be revered after it became the law of the land in 1937.
Dissent had proved to be a powerful weapon for change. Furthermore, this era saw the
rise of legal realism. During the majority of Supreme Court history, the Court had acted
as a sort of an Oracle of the Law. In the grand formal style, the justices would, through
their internal debate, derive the correct answer or the “truth” of the law.
This idea that there was a discoverable and objective truth behind the law began
to evaporate in legal academic circles by the 1920s. Although Holmes had argued in his
Lowell Lectures on the common law in 1881 that many extralegal matters affect the law
more than abstract logic or natural law, it was not until forty years later that this would
become a mainstream idea in the legal academy. Coincidentally, the rise of legal realism
was centered at Yale and Columbia during the late teens and early 1920s when future
Chief Justice Stone was dean of the Columbia Law School (1910-1923). Stone was
educated in, and as dean participated in the creation of, a vastly different legal world
than that known by his predecessors. The broad social forces that led to the New Deal,
the rise of legal realism, and the change in the cases heard by the Court greatly
contributed to Stone’s attitudes about law and about how “truth” should be determined.
By 1941, the Court was also populated with a more diverse (at least intellectually
diverse) group of justices than at any earlier time. During the 1920’s when Stone
ascended to the Court, the legal realists and the new process for deciding the law were
well represented on the Court by Justice Brandeis. Brandeis, like Holmes, was revered
for his powerful dissents and his passion for change in the law. Dissenting in Gilbert v
Minnesota, Brandeis first suggested that the liberties protected by the Fourteenth
Amendment should include civil liberties as well as property rights.195 This period of
history was a wellspring for change in the law and it was at the Supreme Court that the
reformers were able, by building upon the reasoning of past dissenting opinions, to
effect their revolution.
Chief Justice Stone admired the practice of dissent and its recent history in the
Court. He knew the power of Holmes and Brandeis to shape the law through dissent,
and he encouraged the practice.196 Therefore, compared to earlier chief justices who
sought compromise and unanimity, Stone could be seen as an ineffective “leader.”
of assembly clause); Cantwell v Connecticut, 310 US 296 (1940) (incorporating free exercise of religion clause);
Everson v Board of Education, 330 US 1 (1947) (incorporating establishment of religion clause); In re Oliver, 333 US
257 (1948) (incorporating public trial right); Wolf v Colorado, 338 US 25 (1949) (incorporating unreasonable search
and seizure clause). The incorporation parade paused for a decade or so before resuming in the civil-rights era of the
Sixties and Seventies. See Gideon v Wainwright, 372 US 335 (1963) (incorporating right to assistance of counsel in all
felony cases); Pointer v Texas, 380 US 400 (1965) (incorporating right to confrontation of adverse witnesses); Klopfer
v North Carolina, 386 US 213 (1967) (incorporating right to speedy trial); Washington v Texas, 388 US 14 (1967)
(incorporating right to compulsory process to obtain witness testimony); Duncan v Louisiana, 391 US 145 (1968)
(incorporating trial by impartial jury); Rabe v Washington, 405 US 313 (1972) (incorporating notice of accusation).
Some rights have not been incorporated (yet). See Curtis v Loether, 415 US 189 (1974) (addressing right to jury trial in
civil cases); Presser v Illinois, 116 US 252 (1886) (rejecting incorporation of 2nd Amendment).
195 See Gilbert v Minnesota, 254 US 325 (1920).
196 The most startling example of this power comes from the cases Minersville School District v Gobitis, 310
US 586 (1940), and West Virginia Board of Education v Barnette, 319 US 624 (1943). In Gobitis, Chief Justice Stone
dissented from an 8-member majority holding that Jehovah’s Witnesses could be expelled from public school for
failing to salute the flag during the Pledge of Allegiance. Gobitis, 310 US at 601-02. In the very next term, five justices
were persuaded by Stone’s dissent, and voted to overrule Gobitis in a case again involving Jehovah’s Witnesses and
the Pledge. Barnette, 319 US at 642
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Under his leadership, conference debates among the justices were often heated and
filled with controversy.197 Stone argued that “[t]he right of dissent is an important one
and has proved to be such in the history of the Supreme Court . . . I do not think it is the
appropriate function of a Chief Justice to attempt to dissuade members of the Court
from dissenting in individual cases.”198 The “history” that Stone was referring to was the
recent vindication of Holmes’s dissent in Lochner. Stone was a new breed of lawyer at
the helm of the law’s most powerful entity during a fundamental change in our
understanding of legal reasoning. Law was now more like politics, and Stone was willing
to assert the Supreme Court as a political branch. Stone achieved this revolution in pat
by encouraging the use of dissenting opinions, just as Marshall implemented his
revolution by introducing consensus. The means were different, but the ends were the
same.
Stone increased the power of the Court, and thus achieved the same results as
Marshall, but for different reasons and in different circumstances. Both Marshall and
Stone sought a more active role for the Court. To increase the power of the Court
specifically and the law generally, Stone encouraged debate and controversy, rather than
suppressing it as Marshall was required to do, to accomplish the same end. Only by
empowering the Court to act even without unanimity could Stone extend the reach of
the Court from primarily economic matters into the realm of civil liberties.
It is not necessary to say that Stone knew that increasing tolerance for dissent
would have the impact it did on the Court’s role. The practice no doubt seemed natural
and reflected the mood of the times and of the justices then on the Court. But when
viewed in light of the other discursive changes, it seems clear that these explanations are
just “conditions of possibility” that undergird the true explanation for the practice.
After Stone’s brief tenure as chief justice, the unanimity rule was dead for good—
in spite of immediate steps to reverse the trend. To replace Stone as chief justice,
President Truman chose Fred Vinson, who was known for his sociable and likable
personality.
Although Truman admired Vinson’s record . . . his
personality was the most important factor influencing the
decision to appoint him . . . His sociability and friendliness,
his calm, patient, and relaxed manner, his sense of humor,
his respect for the views of others, his popularity with the
representatives of many factions, and his ability to conciliate
conflicting views and clashing personalities and to work out
compromises were qualities that Truman admired. Even
more important, those personal qualities seemed to the
President to fit the needs of the situation inside the Supreme
Court. Dissension and dissent were on the rise . . . Vinson
seemed capable of unifying the Court and thereby improving
its public image.199
197 David Danelski, The Influence of the Chief Justice in the Decisional Process of the Supreme Court, in Joel
Grossman & Richard Wells, eds, Constitutional Law and Judicial Policy Making (1980).
198 Alpheus Mason, Harlan Fiske Stone: Pillar of the Law 608 (1956).
199 Richard Kirkendall, Fred M. Vinson, in 4 Leon Friedman & Fred Israel, eds, The Justices of the United
States Supreme Court 1789-1969 2641 (1969).
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But the other eight justices had all been influenced by Stone and were proponents of
legal realism. They were aware too that dissent had enabled them to expand their role
and power over policy issues. Once the genie was out of the bottle, it was impossible to
put it back in.200 Instead of working toward compromise and consensus, the Vinson
court became known as “nine scorpions in a bottle.”201
The “failure” of Vinson need not be viewed as a personal failure of leadership.
The context in which each of these chief justices tried to lead was different for a variety
of reasons. Even Marshall would not have achieved unanimity in the Supreme Court of
Vinson’s day. The Vinson Court and the Marshall Court both existed during a period of
legal revolution. At the time of Marshall, however, the Court and the justices were
certain about the role of law. Marshall redirected the Court toward a more active
political role. Had Marshall been chief justice in Stone’s time, he likely would have lead
the change from unanimity to the dissent norm. In both cases, it was the end result—
increased authority for the law and the Court—that was important, not the means.
In contrast to the end of the Marshall Court, during the Stone and later Courts,
the dispute was not only about the political nature of the Court, but about the broader
role of law in society. Achieving unanimity in this context is much more difficult and
might have had the opposite effect. The justices, despite somewhat similar backgrounds,
had very different perspectives on such social issues as the rights of women, segregation,
and abortion. In addition, the Court does not act in a political vacuum. The issuance of
unanimous, per curiam opinions “deciding” particularly thorny issues might provoke
extra-judicial or even extra-legal responses. Justice Frankfurter portended the surge in
dissents in one of his first opinions, written in 1939. Frankfurter praised the seriatim
tradition in England, calling it a “healthy practice,” but noting that the Court’s workload
prohibited the justices from doing it in every case.202 He suggested that the Court use the
seriatim approach “when an important shift in constitutional doctrine is announced
after a reconstruction in the membership of the Court.”203 This idea—that all justices
should be heard from on big questions—originated with Madison, who wrote in an 1819
letter:
I could have wished also that the Judges had delivered their
opinions seriatim.The case was of such magnitude, in the
scope given to it, as to call, if any case could do so, for the
views of the subject separately taken by them. This might
either by the harmony of their reasoning have produced a
greater conviction in the Public mind; or by its discordance
have impaired the force of the precedent now ostensibly
supported by a unanimous & perfect concurrence in every
argument & dictum in the judgment pronounced.204
See, for example, Rehnquist, The Supreme Court at 148 (cited in note 34) (“Brought in as a mediator,
Vinson largely failed in this task.”).
201 Robert Steamer, Chief Justice: Leadership and the Supreme Court 19 (1986).
202 Graves v New York ex rel. O’Keefe, 306 US 466, 487 (1939) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
203 Id.
204 See Letter from James Madison to Spencer Roane (Sept. 2, 1819), reprinted in, Philip B. Kurland & Ralph
Lerner, eds, The Founders’ Constitution, Article 1, Section 8, Clause 18, Document 15 (1987).
200
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Frankfurter’s suggestion is notable because it previews both the constitutional
showdowns to come and the role of dissent (if not seriatim) in giving the Court
legitimacy to decide these disputes. As Jefferson noted when advocating the writing of
separate opinions, dissent allows judges in the future to overrule bad law based on the
reasoning of their predecessors, in essence allowing the Court, and thus the law and
lawyers, to play a more political role by essentially mollifying the losing parties and
encouraging a continuing legal discourse. Of course, achieving unanimity on
contentious political issues might have been preferred by the winners ex post, but if the
issues were too contentious and the opposition too strong to achieve, ex antes both sides
of the debate would prefer the option value imbedded in a world with dissent. Dissent
allows the Court to continue in its active role post-legal realism.
III.

Recent History: To Seriatim and Back Again?

The last 50 years of Supreme Court history since the time of Chief Justice Stone
have been characterized by a proliferation of dissents.205 During the first 140 years of
Court history there were dissents in less than seven percent of cases; since then, there
have been dissenting opinions in more than half of all cases.206 Chief justices from Stone
to Rehnquist made no attempt to return to a Court of consensus. Chief Justice
205 Not only has the number of dissents increased but so has the vitriol. When justices did dissent during the
Marshall Court, they did so reluctantly and apologetically. This was in part due to the collegial atmosphere that
existed in the “boardinghouse Court.” Compare several opening sentences from dissenting opinions during this
period. Those Federalist justices that supported Marshall’s change in discourse wrote cautiously when dissenting. See
Bank of the United States v Dandridge, 25 US 64, 90 (1827) (Marshall, J. dissenting) (“I should now, as is my custom,
when I have the misfortune to differ from this Court, acquiesce silently in its opinion . . ..”); Mason v Haile, 25 US
370, 379 (1827) (Washington, J. dissenting) (“It has never been my habit to deliver dissenting opinions in cases where
it has been my misfortune to differ from those which have been pronounced by a majority of this Court.”); Drown v
United States., 12 US 110, 129 (1814) (Story, J. dissenting) (“In this case, I have the misfortune to differ in opinion
from my brethren.”). By contrast the two most frequent dissenters during Marshall’s reign Justice Johnson and
Justice Livingston, both Jefferson appointees and strongly opposed to Marshall’s change to unanimous opinions, did
not hesitate to criticize the majority when dissenting. See Kirk v Smith, 22 US 241, 294 (1824) (Johnson, J.
dissenting) (“The reasoning upon this cause, must be utterly unintelligible to those who hear it….”); United States v
Smith, 18 US 153, 163 (1820) (Livingston, J. dissenting) (“In a case affecting life, no apology can be necessary for
expressing my dissent from the opinion which has just been delivered.”). Even these attacks on the majority pale by
comparison to the lack of respect shown fellow justices by modern dissenters. See Lee v Weisman, 505 US 577 (1992)
(Scalia, J. dissenting) (writing that the majority opinion was “oblivious to our history,” “incoherent,” a
“jurisprudential disaster,” and “nothing short of ludicrous.”). This type of name calling and hyperbolic rhetoric is a far
cry from the day when justices rarely had the courage to dissent, and when they did, the guilty feelings compelled
them to apologize publicly. As Roscoe Pound noted long ago, such vitriolic denunciation of other justices is “not good
for public respect for courts and law and the administration of justice.” Roscoe Pound, Cacoethes Dissentiendi: The
Heated Judicial Dissent 39 Aba Journal 794, 795 (1953). Although Judge Posner has argued that justices should
dissent because dissents play (have played) an integral part in the development of law, Posner agrees with Pound that
the acerbic dissent is both unnecessary and destructive. See Richard A. Posner, The Federal Courts: Challenge and
Reform 356-57 (1996). Posner criticizes justices as being more concerned about their individual role and less
concerned with the institutional role of the Court. In cases that are relatively straightforward, Posner agrees with
Justice Taft that a definitive rule that may not be perfect or even “correct” is often better than an uncertain rule. “In
such a case a dissent will communicate a sense of the law’s instability that is misleading.” Id. Accusing judges of
worrying about their own legacy and ego, Posner writes that “[f]rom an institutional perspective it is better for the
disagreeing judge not to dissent publicly [in a case which he knows will not be reconsidered soon], even though such
forbearance will make it more difficult for someone to write the judge’s intellectual biography.” Id at 357.
206 From 1801 to 1940 (Marshall to Hughes) there were approximately 1231 cases with dissents out of a total
of approximately 17,811 (~7 percent); from 1941 to 1997 (Stone to Rehnquist) there were about 3877 cases with
dissents out of a total of approximately 7434 (~52 percent). From 1801 to 1940 (Marshall to Hughes) there were
approximately 1231 cases with dissents out of a total of approximately 17,811 (~7 percent); from 1941 to 1997 (Stone to
Rehnquist) there were about 3877 cases with dissents out of a total of approximately 7434 (~52 percent).
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Rehnquist spoke of dissent in matter-of-fact terms207 and Justice William Brennan
wrote of dissent as a “duty.”208 The dissent norm continues to this day.209
A.

The Modern Hybrid Approach

Although opinions are still issued as “opinions of the court” and separate
opinions are designated as concurrences or dissents, the practical effect has been a
change back to writing separately—back nearly to the tradition of seriatim. For example,
in Turner Broadcasting System v. FCC, the decision was announced as follows:
Kennedy, J., announced the judgment of the Court and
delivered the opinion of the Court, except as to a portion of
Part II-A-1. Rehnquist, C.J., and Stevens and Souter, JJ.,
joined the opinion in full, and Breyer, J., joined except
insofar as Part II-A-1 relied on an anticompetitive rationale.
Stevens, J., filed a concurring opinion. Breyer, J., filed an
opinion concurring in part. O’Connor, J., filed a dissenting
opinion in which Scalia, Thomas, and Ginsburg, JJ.,
joined.210
Dissents, once reserved for only the most profound differences of opinion, are now
commonplace.
There are several reasons why dissenting opinions might be so common today.
Most simply, there is inertia and custom. Perhaps once the practice develops it is hard to
stop; dissent becomes the discourse of law and will continue to be so until another
fundamental shift in power. This tendency to follow the norm was one of the reasons the
age of consensus lasted for almost 100 years after the death of Marshall. In a classic
defense of dissents, Justice Brennan argued that while a justice’s “general duty is to
acquiesce in the rulings of th[e] court,” it was a “duty” (and not “an egoistic act”) for
justices to dissent.211
There are also potential political reasons. Vehement dissents may signal a
political drift within the Court that threatens the stability of the law. The audience for
these dissents would be other justices, the public, the press, advocacy groups, and the
Congress. Dissents signal that the Court is headed down a dangerous path. In this way,
William H. Rehnquist, The Supreme Court: How It Was, How It Is 302-03 (1987).
Brennan, In Defense of Dissents, 37 Hastings L J at 437-38.
209 In 1995 majority opinions represented 43 percent of all opinions. See Posner, Federal Courts at 358
(cited in note 193). See also, Figure 3.
210 Turner Broadcasting System v FCC, 520 US 180 (1997).
211 Brennan, In Defense of Dissents, 37 Hastings L J at 437-38. Justice Brennan and Justice Marshall were
two of the Court’s most frequent and famous dissenters. Not only did these two justices significantly add to the
number of dissenting opinions, but they also introduced a new practice in the Supreme Court—the publishing of
dissents from petitions filed with the Court. During the past 30 years there were hundreds of dissents from petitions
published by Justice Brennan and Justice Marshall. These dissents were occasionally in protest of a denial of
certiorari, but the vast majority was dissents from denials to review sentences of capital punishment. In each case for
death penalty review received by the Court, Justice Brennan and Justice Marshall published a dissent that simply
stated that in their view capital punishment violated the cruel and unusual provision of the 8th Amendment. This
practice was in plain violation of well-established Court precedent. The justices were making an overtly political
statement—a statement to the public and to the future.
207

208
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dissents can be viewed as a way of marshalling groups to influence the
appointment/confirmation process.
Dissent is a tool to seize power within the Court. The minority justices can
silently acquiesce (as was the tradition for the first century and a half of Court history)
or they can alert Court stakeholders about the “errors” of a decision. To do the former
creates a perception that the ruling is settled law and that no changes in Court personnel
will alter the result. To do the latter can weaken the precedent and thus encourage
judicial or political responses. Like-minded lower court judges may feel emboldened by
the dissents, and attempt to narrow the rulings. Dissents also communicate to justices in
the future (either current or new members of the Court), providing them with logic and
support for voting to reverse or narrow the holding.
Another reason for the continuing use of dissents is the commonly held belief
that dissents make the law better or make better law. This is based on the power of
famous and not-so-famous dissents throughout history to shape the Court’s future
holdings. Think of the success of Holmes’s dissent in Lochner and Harlan’s dissent in
Plessy.212 As Justice Brennan argued, dissents are offered as a corrective in “the hope
that the Court will mend the error of its ways in a later case.”213 In addition, dissents
may enable lower courts or future coalitions of justices to narrow a majority opinion
that sweeps too broadly. Brennan views these as essential components of judicial
determination of the “truth.” Therefore, Brennan criticized Chief Justice Marshall as
“shut [ting] down the marketplace of ideas” when he instituted the consensus norm.
This marketplace of legal ideas, Brennan argued, is necessary for the creation of quality
legal decisions. In this way, Brennan sees the publication of multiple opinions as
analogous to legal argument within the courtroom.214
212 Although the law would be less great without the dissents of Brandeis and Holmes, these influential and
often graceful expositions of the law as how it should be are by far the exception from the mass of pointless dissents.
An example of the inefficient use of separate opinions is the opinions of Justice Frankfurter. John P. Frank studied
the separate opinions of Justice Frankfurter, the most frequent concurring justice in the history of the Court. Frank
found that Frankfurter’s opinions were almost never cited by anyone. See John P. Frank, Marble Palace: The
Supreme Court in American Life 126 (1958). Frank concluded that this was a waste of energy and talent and led to
unnecessary ambiguity and uncertainty in the law. Even Justice Holmes, who was known as the “Great Dissenter,”
remarked that dissents are in most cases “useless and undesirable.” Northern Securities Co. v United States, 193 US
197, 400 (1904). Therefore, Holmes was want to dissent and discouraged the practice in all but the most necessary
circumstances. Like the boy who cried wolf, the more one dissents, the less likely dissents are to be seriously
considered. Familiarity of dissent breeds contempt.
213 Brennan, In Defense of Dissents, 37 Hastings L J at 430. A classic example of this in our era is the
dissenting opinion of then-Associate Justice Rehnquist in Garcia v San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority, in
which he wrote, that the states’ rights principles he and the other dissenters were advocating were “a principle that
will, I am confident, in time again command the support of a majority of this court.” 469 US 528, 580 (1985). After
the Court’s stunning series of 5-4 decisions over the past decade upholding the rights of states against federal
interests, Rehnquist has proved to be quite a prognosticator.
214 Another possible explanation for continued dissents is the rise of the law clerk and the expansion of
opinions to resemble law review articles. As the length and legal extent of an opinion increases with more and more
arguments and footnotes, so does the grounds for possible disagreement among the justices. Finally there is the
possibility that modern justices are generally more apt to desire individual recognition. Supreme Court justices now
have their own jurisprudence that is studied in law schools and debated in the legal literature. Furthermore, legal
biographies, monographs, and speeches are increasingly popular so as to tempt individual justices to create their own
legacy of judicial opinions. Justice Scalia and Judge Posner both agree that personal recognition is often the
motivating force behind the trend of frequent dissenting opinions. See Antonin Scalia, The Dissenting Opinion, J.
Supreme Court History 33-44 (1994); Posner, Federal Courts at 356-57 (cited in note 198). The power of ego should
not be underestimated. See, for example, Rehnquist, The Supreme Court at 141 (cited in note 34) (commenting on
Justice Franfurter’s proclivity to write separately, and noting the rise in the judicial ego), especially when justices are
so underpaid relative to what they could earn in the private legal world. Without riches, it is understandable that
justices seek individual power and fame.
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But this isn’t the whole story. The criticism of Marshall and the distinction that
Brennan draws between the current and past practice of dissent is flawed. The Supreme
Court is a normalizing entity within the larger perspective of modernity: like all other
forms of modern power, the Court is about the power of domination; the power of
lawyers and judges and citizens over others—the “governmentalization” of society. The
current practice of dissent in exactly the same terms and achieving exactly the same
results as Marshall’s consensus norm—an increase in Court power. To achieve these
ends, the Court has adopted various discursive practices throughout its history
depending on the circumstances of society at the time. When Marshall took control of
the Court, there existed a power vacuum at the national level. The consensus norm was a
way for the Court to achieve not only power vis-à-vis the other branches of government,
but also power in the form of “governmentalization.” By increasing the authority of the
Court, law as an institution was able to intrude into previously uncharted territory.
Lawyers and judges became more important. The discourse of law was forever altered in
favor of greater judicial authority over other forms of government and the lives of
individual citizens.
At first blush, the rise of the dissenting opinion seems to offer a counterexample
to this theory of Supreme Court normalization. Published separate opinions allow the 11
circuit courts and hundreds of lower federal and state courts to offer their own narrower
(or broader) interpretation of an opinion. In addition, dissents enable future justices to
overrule an opinion and reverse the trend of the law. By limiting the authority that
comes with a 9-0 opinion, dissents undermine the normalizing power of the Court. Even
Supreme Court justices recognize this impact. In controversial cases, the Court will go
out of its way to try to achieve a unanimous result. For example, in Clinton v Jones, a
highly politicized case involving a conflict between the power of the executive and the
judiciary, the Court achieved a 9-0 majority in order to strengthen the Court’s
decision.215 A 5-4 opinion with only “conservative” justices in the majority would have
been highly criticized as a political attempt to undermine the power of the president.216
The result instead has been an acceptance that only can come when the Court seems
united and apolitical.
Justice Scalia recently wrote about the role of dissenting opinions. Scalia argued
that dissenting opinions augment the prestige of individual justices while allowing
“genuine” unanimity to have great force when most needed.217 As an example of when
unanimity was “most needed,” Scalia cites to Brown v Board of Education.218 Although
in Brown and Clinton unanimity was necessary to achieve political acceptance, in the
majority of cases decided today, dissent provides the same result. Ironically, the practice
of dissent provides the Court as an institution with a public and political acceptance it
would be unable to achieve with per curiam opinions.
215 Clinton v Jones, 520 US 681 (1997). In fact this was an 8-0-1 majority in which Justice Breyer concurred
with the majority. However, Justice Breyer’s opinion reads more like a dissent. Breyer probably joined the majority
primarily to achieve unanimity, while writing separately in order to undercut the majority opinion (?) or to offer
future Supreme Court justices an antiprecedent, or to offer lower court judges an escape hatch around the decision.
Other examples of this need abound. See, for example, United States v. Nixon, 418 US 683 (1974) (requiring
President Nixon to turn over the Watergate tapes); Cooper v. Aaron, 358 US 1 (1958) (requiring states to abide by
federal desegregation law).
216 See, for example, Bush v Gore, 531 US 98 (2000) (reserving, 5-4, the recount of the ballots in the 2000
presidential election by the Florida Supreme Court).
217 See Scalia, Dissenting Opinion, J. Supreme Court History at 33-44 (cited in note 207).
218 347 US 483 (1954).
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This goes back to the point Chief Justice Charles Evans Hughes made about what
is needed to “sustain the court in public confidence.”219 The credibility of the Court iin
general is enhanced when it reveals, at least to a degree, the integrity of its deliberative
decisionmaking process. Kevin Stack argues that the “Supreme Court’s legitimacy
depends in part upon the Court reaching its judgments through a deliberative
process.”220 Decision making at the Court is secret. Only the nine justices attend the
conference of justices and the circulation of draft opinions is kept hidden from public
view. Given the secrecy of the Supreme Court process for deciding cases, “dissent is
necessary to expose the deliberative character of the Court’s decision-making.”221
In Stack’s view, majorities, concurrences, and dissents offer a published version
of the behind-the-scenes debate in the Supreme Court conference room. This public
airing of the deliberative process lends legitimacy to the institution. This cuts to the
heart of Jefferson’s criticism of opinions of the court. Jefferson encouraged the use of
seriatim opinions in order to expose each justice to public view, so they would have to
consider and reason through each case. With individual opinions, justices expose their
competence and legal analysis to the world for criticism. In this way, dissenting opinions
arguably create better justices. With their reputation or career on the line, justices have
the incentive to consider each case carefully.
But this account is not complete. Dissent is not just about modernity’s quest for
deliberative democracy or necessary for the proper functioning of a Supreme Court. It is
also about the type of law being practiced before the Court. Dissent is not only necessary
to ensure the legitimacy of the Court, but also gives law the authority to resolve
controversial social issues—it ensures a particular type of Court legitimacy. Just as the
opinion of the court was necessary to increase the power of the Court during the
Marshall era, dissent is the strategy that enables the Court and the law in general to
maintain its institutional power given the highly political nature of the cases the Court
decides today. Dissent ensures legal control over society just as the unanimity norm was
necessary to achieve the same result in the early nineteenth century. In this light,
unanimity and dissent are means to achieve the same ends— increased power and a
greater role of normalization for courts and lawyers.
In order to test this hypothesis, let us compare the origin of unanimity and the
origin of modern dissent. Despite the long history of openness in the judicial process,
Lord Mansfield instituted a change to unanimity in order to achieve greater legal control
over the commercial law. Chief Justice Marshall seized upon this same power to
increase the reach of the judiciary into new realms. This extension was not simply a
greater centralization of power, but also an increase in establishment of broad norms
and the enabling force behind modernity’s juridical monarchy. For one hundred years,
the unanimity consensus existed in part because of this purpose, but the inertia of
institutional processes and the culture of the legal profession also perpetuated the norm.
During this time, the Supreme Court was deciding similar types of cases. On common
law and primarily economic matters, the Court was generally accepted as legitimate
despite the secrecy of its process.
But then, in the early 1940s, the conditions of possibility were such that a
departure from the consensus norm was necessary. The origin of law evolved from
Hughes, Supreme Court at 67-68 (cited in note 12).
Kevin M. Stack, The Practice of Dissent in the Supreme Court, 105 Yale L J 2235, 2236 (1996).
221 Id at 2246.
219

220
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natural law to legal realism—politics entered the law explicitly for the first time. But
legal realism was a symptom of a broader change in society. Issues never before
considered as properly before the Court were thrust into the discourse of the law. This
change precipitated a crisis for both the law and the Court.
How is it possible to address these often highly political subjects without
sacrificing judicial integrity? The partial answer was dissent. Separate opinions not only
show society that the process of decision making is legitimate, but also allow those who
oppose a particular result to take comfort that the result may someday be reversed. This
is Brennan’s idea of dissent as a corrective force. The corrective force of dissents is a
two-way street. Both good and bad law is subject to the force of criticism, depending on
the prevailing political attitude of the Court. Dissents therefore preserve the ability of
the Court to maintain its normalizing power. The vulnerability of precedents based on
less than a unanimous judgment makes the Court and the law invulnerable.
Imagine a per curiam opinion that overruled all affirmative action programs or
established a constitutional right to an abortion, where the absence of dissent reflected
mere conformity rather than actual agreement. Such an opinion would be criticized in
part because of Stack’s notion of legitimacy, but also because opponents of the opinion
would have no legal grounds to continue the fight. A unanimous opinion is so strong as
to be susceptible only to constitutional amendment or impeachment of individual
justices, both of which are unlikely.222 By contrast, dissent allows lower courts, lawyers,
and politicians to measure the weight of the opinion and to plan a political or legal
counterattack. Dissents lead to ambiguity and hope of change, both of which are fertile
ground for legal fights and more lawyers. Litigation strategy often depends on the
strength of precedents or the voting records of the current justices. Without such
possibilities for counterattack, the opinion would carry more weight, but the integrity of
law and the Court might well come under siege from more dangerous from political
forces.223 Possible political reactions are impeachment, change in Court composition or
jurisdiction,224 or a constitutional amendment.225 Congress’ power is robust here, as the
222 Jefferson wrote about how difficult impeachment would be, and how this interplays with judicial
discourse. See Letter of Thomas Jefferson to Edward Livingston, in 16 Lipscomb & Bergh, eds, The Writings of
Thomas Jefferson: Memorial Edition 114 (1903-04). ("I . . . [am] against caucusing judicial decisions, and for
requiring judges to give their opinions seriatim, every man for himself, with his reasons and authorities at large, to be
entered of record in his own words. A regard for reputation, and the judgment of the world, may sometimes be felt
where conscience is dormant, or indolence inexcitable. Experience has proved that impeachment in our forms is
completely inefficient."); see also Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Spencer Roane, in Paul Leicester Ford, ed, The
Works of Thomas Jefferson (1904-05) (“For experience has already shown that the impeachment it has provided is
not even a scarecrow. . .”).
223 For example, Bork proposed congressional review of Supreme Court decisions or curtailing the scope of
judicial review. See Robert H. Bork, Our Judicial Oligarchy, 67 First Things 21, 21 (1996). Bork argued that "[t]he
most important moral, political and cultural decisions affecting our lives are steadily being removed from democratic
control,” and that a “change in our institutional arrangements” is the only thing that “can halt the transformation of
our society and culture by judges.” Id. His solution: “Decisions of courts might be made subject to modification or
reversal by majority vote of the Senate and the House of Representatives. Alternatively, courts might be deprived of
the power of constitutional review.” Id. This point of view is a departure for Bork, who argued previously that a veto
over the Supreme Court was dangerous because it could be used destructively to overturn the “Court’s essential
work.” See Robert H. Bork, The Tempting of America: The Political Seduction of the Law 55 (1997) (“If two thirds of
the Senate might have overruled Dred Scott, then perhaps it is imaginable that two-thirds might have overruled a case
like Brown v Board of Education. That depends on the passions of the moment, but is obvious that unpopular rulings
may be easily overturned as improper ones. There is, after all, no reason to think that over time the Senate will be a
more responsible interpreter of the Constitution than the Court.”).
224 See note 164.
225 Although the tactic of reversing a specific opinion with a constitutional amendment has been used only
twice in Supreme Court history (the 11th Amendment “overruled” Chisholm v Georgia, 2 US 419 (1793); the 16th
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Constitution grants it the “power to decide how much appellate jurisdiction, and of what
sort, the Supreme Court would enjoy.”226
Dissent undermines the force of an opinion, and allows opponents to hope for the
day when they will control the Court. Paradoxically by undermining the authority of the
Court, dissent increases the power of the Court and the law by insulating it from
potential political attacks. Dissent keeps potentially extrajudicial subjects such as
abortion and affirmative action within the purview of the law courts, in just the same
way that Mansfield brought commercial disputes into the ambit of the common law.
B.

The Roberts Gambit?

At his confirmation hearings, Chief Justice Roberts expressed a narrow
conception of the role of the Court in public policy matters. Using a baseball analogy,
Roberts defined the Supreme Court’s role as simply “calling balls and strikes,” rather
than deciding the fundamental rules of the game. He distinguished himself from
justices Antonin Scalia and Clarence Thomas, by proffering himself as, to use Cass
Sunstein’s terms, a “minimalist” rather than a Scalia or Thomas-like “visionary.” Some
doubt the seriousness of this claim, but Roberts has stated publicly that he wants the
Court to return to a Marshall-like consensus norm. Critics object to his proposed reform
of discourse. Geoffrey Stone recently opined that Supreme Court opinions are not about
deciding outcomes but announcing legal principles that will give guidance to lower
courts, police, citizens, and so on—they are the creators of legal truth grids, and small or
narrow grids are unhelpful. Stone writes:
Whenever the Supreme Court decides a case “narrowly,”
resolving only the particular dispute before it, it leaves the
rest of the society and rest of the legal system in the dark.
When the Supreme Court leaves important issues
unresolved, everyone else must guess about what they can
and cannot do under the law. Lower courts are free to
disagree with one other, with the result that the scope of
constitutional rights will vary randomly from state to state
and district to district throughout the nation. Unnecessary
uncertainty is not a healthy state of affairs when it comes to
the freedom of speech, the freedom of religion, or the right of
the people to be secure against unreasonable searches and
seizures. It may be easier for the Court to decide cases
“narrowly,” but it creates chaos for everyone else in the
system.227
Stone also echoes Jefferson. He writes that opinions without dissent are an
“abdication” of judicial responsibility to expose judicial decision making to public
Amendment “overruled” Pollock v Farmers’ Loan, 158 US 601 (1895)), this may be attributable in part to the fact that
the losing parties before the Court may find sufficient solace in the power of dissenting opinions to achieve similar
ends.
226 See Friedman, History of American Law at 142 (cited in note 20).
227 Geoffrey Stone, Chief Justice Roberts and the Role of the Supreme Court, The University of Chicago
Faculty Blog (Feb. 2, 2007), available at: http://uchicagolaw.typepad.com/faculty/2007/02/chief_justice_r.html.
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critique: “The legitimacy of the judicial branch rests largely on the responsibility of
judges to explain and justify their decisions in opinions that can be publicly read,
analyzed, and criticized.” Consensus decisions that paper over differences do not do this.
Here we see Jefferson’s arguments about transparency and accountability. Stone also
believes dissent is essential to overruling bad law, and he, like Jefferson, cites examples
of cases in which results we think are right were first suggested in earlier dissents.228
Squelching dissent would “degrade the quality of the Court’s work and undermine the
public’s and the legal profession’s ability to evaluate the seriousness and persuasiveness
of the Court’s reasoning. In the long run, it would undermine the Court itself.”229
Although Jefferson and Stone make the same arguments about the value of
dissent, remember that Jefferson wanted to decrease the power of the Court, while
Stone presumably wants to increase it or, at least, keep it the same. This exposes these
arguments, as well as the arguments of their opponents—Marshall and Roberts
respectively—for what they are: justifications for a particular political role for the Court.
The critiques are instrumental only. Neither Jefferson nor Stone believes that dissent
makes better law in the abstract, but rather that separate opinions from that of the
Court were necessary for an expression of their particular preference for the locus of
legal power. Jefferson wanted a weak Court so power could be located in the legislature,
presidency, and the states, and dissent was the means to weaken the Court given its
institutional position at the time. Stone wants a strong Court and dissent appears to be
the means to strengthen the Court at this time.
To put it another way, taking Chief Justice Roberts at his word, the preference for
unanimity does not obviously sit well with the current stable of cases and the main
argument of this paper—it seems implausible to suggest that Roberts can achieve
unanimity on questions of race, gender, school choice, homosexual rights, the War on
Terror, and other politically contentious issues. So what is his rhetoric about? One
possibility is that Roberts wants to decrease the power of the Court in American society,
and his mechanism for that is same as that urged by Mansfield, Marshall, and Stone,
just in the opposite direction.
IV.

Conclusion

It is not surprising that we observe opinion-delivery practices of Anglo American
courts suited to the particular times. This fact seems almost self evident, but it does
rebut claims that the current practice of writing separately is theoretically and ceteris
paribus superior to other methods. The lesson from history is that allowing or
forbidding dissent is not about getting better law per se, but about achieving some
defined role for courts. This role is typically more power over disputes.
We have seen that the history of debates about the opinion delivery practices of
Anglo-American courts has been about court power. Those arguing for the right to
dissent have sometimes been about limiting court power (e.g., Jefferson) and sometimes
228 Id. (“It is also important to note that some of the most influential opinions in the history of the Supreme
Court were concurring and dissenting opinions. Although they did not command the support a majority of the
Justices at the time, they eventually won the day because of the force of their reasoning. Familiar examples, to name
just a few, include Justice Harlan’s famous dissenting opinion in Plessy v Ferguson, the pivotal dissenting and
concurring opinions of Justices Holmes and Brandeis in a series of free speech decisions following World War I, and
Justice Robert Jackson’s landmark concurring opinion in the Steel Seizure case.”).
229 Id.
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about increasing it (e.g., Brennan). We should view the proposal from Chief Justice
Roberts in this light. Roberts’s nostalgia for the Marshall era of unanimity is about
reducing the power of the Court, both by narrowing individual holdings to open up
decision space for other actors, and also to limit the kinds of cases the Court hears. A
consensus norm is incompatible with deciding the Court’s recent docket of cases, at least
in the broad manner in which they have historically been decided. In this day and age,
narrowness and minimalism go hand in hand with consensus, while breadth and judicial
power go hand in hand with dissent. Of course, it was not always this way, and it may
not be again. This pattern of punctuated equilibrium is bound repeat itself again and
again. Dissent is a powerful tool of the law. And because it is a tool, dissent is used to
achieve the ends of the law, whatever they may be.

Readers with comments should address them to:
Professor M. Todd Henderson
University of Chicago Law School
1111 East 60th Street
Chicago, IL 60637
toddh@uchicago.edu
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